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(Günther Schlee)
about thE SEriES
this series of Field Notes and Research Projects does not aim to compete 
with high-impact, peer reviewed books and journal articles, which are the 
main am bition of scholars seeking to publish their research. rather, contribu-
tions to this series complement such publications. they serve a number of 
different purposes. 
in recent decades, anthropological publications have often been purely dis-
cursive – that is, they have consisted only of words. often, pictures, tables, and 
maps have not found their way into them. in this series, we want to devote 
more space to visual aspects of our data. 
data are often referred to in publications without being presented systematically. 
here, we want to make the paths we take in proceeding from data to conclusions 
more transparent by devoting sufficient space to the documentation of data.
in addition to facilitating critical evaluation of our work by members of the 
scholarly community, stimulating comparative research within the institute and 
beyond, and providing citable references for books and articles in which only a 
limited amount of data can be presented, these volumes serve an important func-
tion in retaining connections to field sites and in maintaining the involvement 
of the people living there in the research process. those who have helped us 
to collect data and provided us with information can be given these books and 
booklets as small tokens of our gratitude and as tangible evidence of their 
cooperation with us. When the results of our research are sown in the field, new 
discussions and fresh perspectives might sprout.
Especially in their electronic form, these volumes can also be used in the 
production of power points for teaching; and, as they are open-access and free 
of charge, they can serve an important public outreach function by arousing 
interest in our research among members of a wider audience.
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introduction
(Peter Finke and Günther Schlee)
casca 
Centre for Anthropological Studies on Central Asia
This is the first joint production of casca, the centre for anthropological 
studies on central asia. CASCA was established in 2012 by the Max Planck 
Institute for Social Anthropology, Department Integration and Conflict, in 
halle and the department of social and cultural anthropology, university 
of Zurich, to create a forum of distinguished anthropological engagement 
with the region.
But in many ways the history of casca goes much further back. with 
the foundation of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in 1999, 
günther Schlee, director of the Department Integration and Conflict, decided 
to make central asia one of the three regional foci of his research program, 
besides western and eastern africa. the reasons for this are partly outlined 
in his contribution to this volume on ‘Fulbe and Uzbeks Compared’. Among 
the first to take up work on central asia at the institute were Peter Finke 
and meltem sancak, both also present in this volume. a few years later this 
regional focus was institutionalised as a research group on central asia 
within the Department Integration and Conflict, headed by Peter Finke. this 
collaboration has continued ever since his move to Zurich in 2006 where he 
established a chair for social anthropology again with central asia as the 
main, though not exclusive regional focus.
we use the term central asia in a rather broad way including the former 
soviet republics of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan, the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, as well as the mongolian 
and tibetan-speaking areas occasionally labelled as inner asia. research 
is equally conducted in adjacent regions in northern afghanistan and iran 
or southern siberia as well as among the new and old diasporas of central 
asians living in places like moscow or istanbul. this gives credit to the many 
similarities in geographical, historical and cultural terms that have shaped 
the life of people in the region, including a continental and arid climate, an 
economy traditionally based on irrigated agriculture, pastoral nomadism and 
trade as well as parallels in social organisation and religious practices. as a 
crossroad between various parts of the eurasian continent, central asia has 
always been a source as well as a destination of cultural and political influ-
ences far beyond its boundaries. once a cradle of world empires like the vari-
ous turkic and mongolian statehoods it later became a colonial backwater 
subdued to russian and chinese dominance before taking part in one of the 
largest human experiments, the creation of socialist systems and their more 
recent reversals.
vi Introduction
in academia as well as in public central asia is still a little known part of 
the world. this is particularly true for empirical disciplines like anthropology 
because access for research was highly limited during the socialist period 
and, in many parts, beyond. this has changed to some degree in recent years 
and a number of studies on the current transformation processes and the need 
for people to adopt in economic, social as well as cultural terms have been 
conducted. From an anthropological perspective, we give particular attention 
to the local perspective of people who, in a world of changing geo-political 
strategies and national power struggles, try to create new meanings to their 
lives. This includes, for example, issues of economic relationships and strati-
fication, new forms of social cooperation, ethnic identification and alliances 
as well as the revival and reconfiguration of religious schemes.
the aim of casca is therefore to foster empirically grounded research on 
these and related topics from an anthropological perspective and to strength-
en its position within the discipline as a regionally defined sub-field. It does 
so in close cooperation and as part of a global network of colleagues and aca-
demic institutions both in the region and beyobnd. in addition to its research 
agenda casca is also committed to developing teaching facilities on the 
level of Ba-, ma- and Phd courses as well as international summer schools 
and regular courses, mainly based at the university of Zurich.
with this booklet we would like to introduce casca and its objectives. it 
will start with a summary of a larger research project on Uzbek identity by 
Peter Finke, including the outline of its expansion on the Uzbek diasporas. 
The latter is, in fact, the first joint project within the framework of casca, 
funded by the swiss national science Foundation (snsF) and the german 
research Board (dFg). Following on this is a longer essay on comparisons 
between central asian and african societies by günther schlee. in the sec-
ond part of the booklet, some of the current projects and research activities of 
members of casca are introduced, demonstrating the regional and thematic 
scope of work done at the two constituting institutions in halle and Zurich.
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Patterns oF identiFication 
and ethnic diFFerentiation 
in central asia: 
the case oF the uZBeks1
(Peter Finke)
Profile
Peter Finke is a Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Zurich 
and one of the co-directors of CASCA. He holds a PhD in Anthropology from 
the University of Cologne and a postdoctoral degree (habilitation) from Leip-
zig University. From 2000 until 2005, he was a Research Fellow at the Max 
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology and in 2005 became Head of the Re-
search Group on Central Asia. In 2002/2003, he was a Visiting Assistant Pro-
fessor at the University of New Hampshire, U.S.A., and from 2004 until 2006 
at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. He has conducted 
long-term fieldwork in various parts of Central Asia, particularly Mongolia, 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. His main research interests include economic an-
thropology, social transformation processes, identity and human cognition.
on the night of june 10th, 2010 riots broke out in the city of osh in southern 
Kyrgyzstan leaving several hundred people dead, the majority of them Uz-
beks. this outburst of violence soon became described as the result of old 
animosities and hatred between two ethnic groups, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, that 
unloaded itself in a time of crisis. at the same time a multitude of concurrent 
factors seemed to have triggered the events. most prominent among these, so 
a common view, were the political vacuum in the country after the preceding 
new ‘revolution’ in April of the same year and control of the drug trafficking 
routes that cross southern Kyrgyzstan. As important, however, the June riots 
seemed closely to resemble the clashes in 1990 between the two groups in 
question, which had to a large degree shaped the image of central asia as a 
crisis spot since then (Balci 2010; Beyer 2010; Petric 2010; mcBrien 2011).
As always, things were much more complicated on the ground and a fi-
nal answer to reasons and consequences can hardly be provided by now. an 
1   the following is in large parts a summary of arguments laid out in more detail 
elsewhere (cf. Finke in press). i would like to thank günther schlee, wolfgang 
Holzwarth, Jürgen Paul, Alessandro Monsutti, Baktygul karimova and indira 
alibayeva for their inputs on earlier incarnations of this.
2 A Comparative and Theoretical Framework
analysis of these and similar events is, however, of tremendous importance 
for a better understanding of the region in a period of rapid change after the 
collapse of the socialist regimes. and they will have an impact on the de-
velopment of the region and far beyond. ethnic tensions and inter-regional 
competition within and among the new independent states are key issues in 
this respect and have been much debated. many observers during the early 
days of independence held that the largely artificially created former Soviet 
republics of Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, turkmenistan and tajik-
istan corresponded only roughly, if at all, to any pre-existing states. There-
fore, ethnic tensions and inter-state rivalries were expected to soon break out 
and endanger regional stability. Fortunately, in spite of events like the one 
mentioned above these prophecies proved to be unfounded for the most part. 
nevertheless, they have shaped the image of the region as one of imminent 
clashes and potentially failing states to a large degree.
this is partly due to the fact that the study of ethnic identity, nation build-
ing and conflict in central asia and afghanistan has so far largely remained 
on a macro level of national politics, international relations, and intellectual 
elites (see, for example, Akiner 1996; smith et al. 1998; jones luong 2002; 
Sengupta 2003; Yalcin 2002). Their impacts on people’s lives in the context 
of new independent statehoods and the massive irruption of transnational or-
ganizations such as NGOs are less well known. To achieve a more balanced 
view, it is essential to look at the meanings ethnic and other social identities 
have for people in everyday life as identity games always take place in the 
context of national politics on the one hand and pre-existing concepts of 
identity on the other.
this project wants to do just that. Building on earlier research on the dif-
ferent configurations of Uzbek identity within the state bearing that name, 
the focus is on processes of ethnic relations and conflict management in 
contemporary central asia and northern afghanistan where the same group 
forms a sizeable minority. The aim is thus to examine processes of identity 
formation in Central Asia by taking one example, the Uzbeks, and following 
the differences and changes in a variety of settings as titular ethnicity or as 
diaspora. each of these settings represents a distinct case in terms of ecologi-
cal and economic conditions, political configuration, and ethnic composition. 
in each case, mutual demarcations and inter-ethnic relations also differ in 
response to the respective situation. with this we envision this project to help 
gaining a better understanding of ongoing processes in the region. while 
some of the crisis scenarios for central asia and afghanistan are obviously 
well founded, the reasons and mechanisms behind are less clear and plagued 
by an essentializing view on ethnicity in itself as a source of conflict.
this project starts from a Barthian perspective that identity markers and 
inter-ethnic relations differ according to the particular setting, as they are 
shaped by the respective local ethnic configuration, economic options and 
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national politics (Barth 1969). depending on the overall setting, people em-
ploy distinct ways of understanding Uzbekness. What is important is that this 
diversity is not harmonised in local and national narratives, but rather part of 
the very concept. Uzbeks of different provenience are expected to differ in 
behaviour and to share patterns more with other local groups, in particular 
with Tajiks. Widespread bilingualism, a high proportion of mixed marriages 
and more or less identical cultural patterns are the basis for this. common 
residence and shared socialization rather than descent are thus perceived as 
the basis for collective identity (Finke in press).
historical Background
Because of their size and central location, the case of the Uzbeks is a particular-
ly sensitive as well as instructive one. with some 30 million people they form 
the largest ethnic group in central asia. more than 20 million of these live 
in Uzbekistan while the remaining settle primarily in adjacent regions of the 
neighbouring states of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, turkmenistan and 
afghanistan, where they often form regional majorities (landau and kellner-
heinkele 2001; schetter 2003). these diasporas are not the result of any large-
scale migration during recent times. rather, the arbitrariness of the boundaries 
established during early Soviet times resulted in artificial entities that often cut 
through ethnic as well as geographic units (Vaidyanath 1967; schoeberlein 
1994; Szporluk 1994; hirsch 2000). these are usually long-established Uzbek 
communities that happened to end up on the other side of a state border and 
usually form larger regional clusters with groups on the other side.
But the Uzbeks constitute not only the largest indigenous group, they also 
occupy an intermediary geographical and cultural position, inhabiting the 
heartland of the oases belt in central asia. linguistically as well as cultur-
ally, their formation as a distinct group can be interpreted as the result of 
the intermingling between the original iranian population and the turkic-
speaking pastoral nomads that entered the area in succeeding waves since 
the sixth century. Speaking a turkic language the Uzbeks strongly resemble 
the cultural patterns of their Persian-speaking tajik neighbours and many of 
them are presumably the descendants of Turkified Iranians (allworth 1990, 
golden 1992; Baldauf 1991; ilkhamov 2004; Finke in press). their evolu-
tion as a group thus epitomises two processes that have shaped the history 
of central asia more than anything else, namely, the interaction between 
nomads and sedentaries (and the integration of the former into the latter’s 
social and cultural patterns), and the gradual Turkification of the formerly 
iranian population.
It has been frequently stated that there exists a mismatch between the con-
temporary name of the group and its linguistic and cultural heritage. this is 
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certainly true in some respects. Although the name as such had existed be-
fore, it had been used for self-designation only by a fraction of the ancestors 
of the present population (Baldauf 1991; roy 2000). the vast majority of 
Uzbeks, at least within the boundaries of Uzbekistan, speak today a Qarluq, 
or eastern turkic dialect, have largely given up a tribal kinship system (if 
they ever had one) and all in all are representatives of a sedentary cultural 
schema that has characterised the oases in the region for several millennia. 
their ancestors would rarely have denominated themselves as Uzbeks. The 
later nomadic invaders, the Qipchaq-speaking Uzbeks, merely gave their 
name to an already existing amalgamation of groups whose identity was 
based primarily on locality. indeed, for a long time, in some regions until 
the early 20th century, the term Uzbek was reserved for the remaining semi-
nomads that were conceptualised as the local other towards the sedentary 
population, irrespective of linguistic closeness (karmysheva 1976; shani-
jazov 1978; Zhdanko 1978; Baldauf 1991; Fragner 1998; ilkhamov 2002, 
2004; schoeberlein 1994).
thus, so the concluding argument, the Uzbeks of today are primarily the 
product of the so called soviet national delimitation process (cf. Baldauf 1991; 
hirsch 2000; suny and martin 2001), which resulted not only in the creation 
of a number of ethnic entities that until then had hardly existed, but also in the 
establishment of corresponding administrative units. the process of creating 
an Uzbek natsionalnost (‘nationality’) has been described as particularly arti-
ficial and as a deliberate act on the part of the authorities with little justification 
in pre-existing patterns of identity. Because of the ambiguous connotations of 
the term ‘sart’ and the Pan-turkic associations that might have been implied 
with the term ‘Turk’, the selection of ‘Uzbek’, however, made political sense, 
Baldauf suggests, even though it seemed arbitrary with regard to the self-iden-
tification of people. For allworth (1990), a more convincing and successful 
choice would have been a common turkestani identity. this, however, was 
discarded by the authorities for ideological and strategic reasons. Yet, it seems 
doubtful whether the political unity of turkestan or a larger muslim entity had 
ever been a viable option, considering that the mutual opposition of the major 
groups in the region often outweighed their common interests (gross 1992; 
schoeberlein 1994; landau 1995; roy 2000).
Of the five republics, Uzbekistan had territorial boundaries that seemed 
to have been drawn in a particularly arbitrary and generous way, including 
most of the fertile agricultural zones of central asia. to make them look 
reasonable, many people inside were forced to register as Uzbeks (allworth 
1990; schoeberlein 1994; subtelny 1994). this included not only the incor-
poration of distinct groups such as the Qurama and the turk (as well as the 
highly ambiguous category of sart) but also numerous tajiks, Kazaks and 
turkmens. not all of this, however, came about as the result of force. some 
groups adopted the label of Uzbek for opportunistic reasons (Baldauf 1991). 
Photo 1: (Former) Kolkhoz workers on a cotton field in the Ferghana Valley
 (P. Finke, 2001)
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it is known from archival material of the period that local and regional ne-
gotiations, not exclusively initiated from above, played an important role 
in determining ethnic and administrative boundaries (Vaidyanath 1967; Bal-
dauf 1991; Slezkine 1994; Keller 2001; martin 2001; suny and martin 2001; 
edgar 2004; hirsch 2005).
the question is, of course, to what degree categories introduced by the 
Soviet nation-builders were able to replace pre-existing ones. While there is 
a multitude of answers to this in the literature, little of that is based on empiri-
cal observations. on the one hand, the soviet creation of nations looked like 
a relatively successful and readily accepted process. among the mechanisms 
that contributed to this was the creation of literary languages, usually on 
the basis of those dialects that were most distinct to each other. in the case 
of the Uzbeks, these were the Iranianised dialects of the Ferghana Valley, 
which lack – in contrast to other turkic languages – vowel harmony (all-
worth 1990: 237). The practice of stating one’s national or ethnic affiliation 
on passports and identity cards also played a role. Such affiliations also had 
an impact on one’s professional life, as it allowed both discriminative and 
affirmative actions (Khazanov 1993: 187). National culture as defined by the 
state was highly celebrated, which not only contributed to stronger feelings 
of separateness but also to the degradation to folkloric traditions. on the 
other hand, many observers thought that such artificial processes could not 
have a deep impact on the people and that traditional patterns would survive 
as a form of resistance (Bennigsen and Broxup 1983; allworth 1990: 3–16). 
while there is little evidence for the latter, the earlier research for this project 
indicates that, indeed, the impact of soviet nation building on local ethnic 
configurations has probably been exaggerated in much of the literature, as 
will be indicated below.
6 A Comparative and Theoretical Framework
Following independence, many authors predicted a reversal of the existing 
hierarchy in that the formerly colonised would try to suppress their former 
colonisers. therefore, tensions between russians and the various muslim 
groups were soon to be expected (cf. Bremmer 1994; smith et al. 1998; 
Schatz 2000). Issues would include conflicts over resource distribution or 
changing access to key political positions. the relations between various 
indigenous groups seemed to be another potential source of conflict. As na-
tional and state boundaries had been designed more or less arbitrarily, they 
would soon be questioned by ethnic, or indeed linguistic, entrepreneurs (cf. 
Fierman 1991; landau and kellner-heinkele 2001). it was thought that non-
members of the titular nation would ultimately have to perceive themselves 
as second-class citizens.
all of the new states are indeed engaged in various projects of national 
identity politics affecting Uzbeks and other minorities as well. And this has 
impacts on internal as well as inter-state relationships. while the current bor-
ders have existed for decades, they have never been an obstacle to circula-
tion during soviet times and were perceived as a simple demarcation line 
between administrative entities. often families ended up on different sides 
of the border but this had very little meaning in everyday life. Borders were 
hardly noticed when crossed. today, they constitute an all too obvious real-
ity. Villages and streets have been cut through, and in the border regions there 
is hardly anyone without relatives who have now become foreign citizens. 
in this way, the contemporary borders became a part of people’s identities, 
although often against their will (sancak 2012; Finke in press). all states, 
however, carefully avoid questioning existing geographical borders. Except 
for marginal calls for realignment, the structure inherited from early soviet 
times has been readily accepted. everyone is apparently afraid of opening a 
Pandora’s box, as minorities can be found on each side of every contempo-
rary boundary. Thus, conflicts have been avoided so far, although a closer 
regional cooperation has not evolved either.
internally, all states oscillate between the promotion of one ethnic group, 
the so-called ‘titular nation’, and broader appeals to the richness of a multi-
ethnic state inherited from the soviet union. the latter is particularly em-
phasised in Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, both states where minorities form a 
large part of the population and ethnic interaction is characterised more by 
opposition and distribution conflicts than by assimilation pressure (svanberg 
1994; eschment 1998; Schatz 2000; Surucu 2002; Gullette 2010). It is less 
pronounced in Uzbekistan, where the numerical strength of the titular group 
seems self-evident in defining the national character. Here, within a multicul-
tural framework, the commonalities shared by all local groups are stressed, 
under the obvious umbrella of the Uzbek majority.
the case of afghanistan is slightly different and will thus serve as an im-
portant control case in the project. Influences have been rare, as the northern 
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border with Central Asia has been difficult to cross during the seventy years 
of existence of the Soviet Union. What is more important, ethnic groups in 
afghanistan have not taken part in the described national delimitation pro-
cesses and thus show different patterns of identification. While some Uzbeks 
have lived there for centuries, many others are the descendants of people 
who escaped from the Soviet regime and forced collectivization in the early 
20th century. after several decades of interruption, some timid cross-border 
exchanges have become possible. In northern Afghanistan, Uzbeks coexist 
with tajiks and Pashtuns, the latter having established a political hegemony 
in the 19th century that has been shaken during the series of civil wars, which 
have been tearing the country apart since 1978 (centlivres and centlivres- 
demont 1988; Rasuly-Paleczek 1998; Monsutti 2005).
some characteristics oF uZBekness
according to the historical and anthropological scholarship, traditional iden-
tity in central asia and afghanistan did not have much of an ethnic nature. 
It is held that people often identified themselves either by larger units (such 
as muslim or turki) or by smaller ones like tribes or local communities (see 
centlivres and centlivres-demont 1988; atkin 1992; gross 1992; schoeber-
lein 1994; Akbarzadeh 1996). This is believed to have been particularly true 
for the traditionally sedentary population, while among the former nomads 
a stronger sense of larger ethnic unity may have been the case (cf. svanberg 
1994; Finke 2004). the settled turkic-speakers – whose descendants call 
themselves Uzbek today – had by then largely given up their tribal organiza-
tion and identified as the neighbouring Iranian-speakers primarily by spatial 
closeness. Overarching ethnonyms like Uzbek or Tajik were of minor signifi-
cance – if they existed at all. Instead regional denominators like Bukharalik 
or Ferghanalik, which typically included other local groups as well, were of 
far greater importance (schoeberlein 1994; Fane 1996; roy 2000). until to-
day, in most parts of the region Uzbeks and tajiks consider each other as par-
ticularly close in spite of the linguistic difference (Finke in press). this is as 
striking in afghanistan, where both groups are confronted by the historically 
dominant Pashtuns whom they see as outsiders (centlivres and centlivres-
demont 1988; roy 1992; Rasuly-Paleczek 1998).
two factors, so the argument developed out of earlier research, were cru-
cial in this respect. one was the intermediate position that a sedentary turkic 
speaker occupied between nomadic tribes and sedentary iranians. this also 
allowed for a larger number of partners in economic and social interaction 
(Finke in press; see also Fragner 1998 for similar argument). thus, the con-
cept of ‘Uzbekness’ exerted an attractiveness on members of other social 
groups over the course of time and which gained a new impetus by being as-
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sociated with independent statehood in recent years. while political pressure, 
both during soviet times and after independence, is an undeniable factor in 
this respect, the process of Uzbekization is also part of a general Turkifica-
tion, which started more than a thousand years ago. in some way, the Uzbeks 
of today can be understood as a culmination of larger processes that have 
been taking place in central asia for centuries, namely the interaction of no-
mads and sedentaries, and the continuous encounters between and blending 
of turkic and iranian speakers.
a second important factor in this process is the relative permeability of the 
concept of Uzbekness as it was by and large sufficient to speak the language 
and behave in a particular cultural way (which includes, amongst others, be-
ing a muslim). i have labelled this a territorial concept of group membership 
and transmission (Finke in press) – in contrast to schemas as among Kazaks or 
Kyrgyz that rely primarily on the idea of genealogical relationships (Hudson 
1938; Finke 2004). thus, one cannot become an accepted member of one of 
those groups that easily. the concept of Uzbekness is more flexible in this re-
gard and includes a definition of locality that acknowledges regional variation 
and the possibility of membership by voluntary decision. therefore, almost 
by definition, it takes on different shapes in various settings, incorporating 
elements of local languages, cultures and social organizations. And within 
each locality people share specific cultural patterns irrespective of their eth-
nic or linguistic affiliation. Thus members of other groups living in the same 
place are often considered closer to oneself than co-ethnics in other parts of 
the country. The concept is thus based on a territorial idea of identification 
indicating that common residence and socialization are conceptualised as key 
variables in shaping an individual’s personhood and identity.
this particular model of Uzbek identity is not only specific within central 
Asia. It also carries implications far beyond purely academic explanations 
into contemporary social and inter-ethnic relations. as is true with other re-
publics in the region, Uzbekistan has a population that is far from homogene-
ous and largely a product of soviet politics. many of its newly refurbished 
old heroes and national symbols have also been claimed by other central 
asian nationalities. in this model, the Uzbeks become the fulfillers of thou-
sands of years of sedentary cultures in the region and as such are the descend-
ents of previous statehoods, like timur, as well as cultural legacies of various 
kinds as the Avesta, the sacred texts of Zoroastrism (Sievers 2002: 118). It 
should be emphasised, however, that these historical figures and events are 
not necessarily declared to be Uzbek in an ethnic sense; rather, they are put 
forward as a legacy that is bound to the territory of the state. in contrast, 
or rather in line with this, comparatively little reference is made to the first 
Uzbeks in the literal sense of the term, i.e., Muhammad Shaybani and his 
Qipchaq-speaking followers – who, in contrast to the Timurids, were indeed 
conquerors from outside –, nor to the early intellectuals of the twentieth cen-
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tury, such as Fayzulla Khojayev, who played an important role in the design 
of the Uzbek SSR (Kurzman 1999: 83).
at the same time, minority languages have been increasingly pushed to the 
margins as education becomes more and more ‘Uzbekised’. This implies an 
invitation to become Uzbeks if people are willing to assimilate into the main-
stream culture. many authors believe that relations with the tajik minority 
are particularly precarious and may prove decisive for the future of the whole 
region (Subtelny 1994; Foltz 1996; roy 2000). according to this view, so-
viet elites had always favoured the Uzbeks over other Central Asian groups, 
particularly the tajiks, as can be inferred from the allotment of cities such as 
Bukhara and samarqand to Uzbekistan. Other authors, however, ascribe the 
ongoing Turkification or Uzbekization to the ambiguity or fragility of tajik 
identity (Atkin 1992; Chvyr 1993; Akbarzadeh 1996b; Fragner 1998; roy 
2000; wennberg 2002). on the other hand, or in line with this territorial idea, 
the fate of the Uzbek ‘diasporas’ is not a big concern neither in academia nor 
in politics, in contrast, for example, to Kazakstan where the government has 
invited all Kazaks living abroad to join their native country (see Buri and 
Finke this volume).
regional Variations
In a first phase of this project, the local understanding of Uzbekness was 
examined in four different settings within Uzbekistan, looking in particular 
at the conceptualization of group boundaries, spheres of social interaction, as 
well as change and transmission of group affiliation and identity. This dem-
onstrated that different regional answers exist to the issues just addressed. 
For example, while in some settings the two categories of Uzbeks and tajiks 
tend to conflate and almost form one bilingual entity, in others they perceive 
each other as more or less close but distinct ethnic groups.
The first of these settings was the oasis of Bukhara and in particular, the 
district of Romitan. Here, the close-knit mixture of Turkic and Iranian speak-
ers has reached a point where boundaries are not only virtually non-existent 
but also instantly denied. in many parts of rural Bukhara, bilingualism and 
mixed ancestry is the norm and also a central part of local identity. Therefore, 
the implementation of the national delimitation process proved particularly 
complicated here so that in many cases brothers ended up with different eth-
nicities (naby 1993). this resulted in a population where almost everyone 
could be labelled an ‘in-between’, claiming of themselves to be ‘one people 
with two languages’ (Finke and sancak 2012). other groups settling in the 
same region are incorporated into this cultural complex to various degrees: 
turkmens and arabs who settled in the oasis several centuries ago are rather 
more integrated, while others such as Kazaks, Ironi, Russians, or tatars that 
Photo 2: Village scene in the Bukhara oasis (P. Finke, 2002)
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arrived at a later date are considered culturally more alien. one reason for 
that was apparently ecology, as the oasis and its hinterland did not allow a 
close coexistence between nomads and sedentaries. those who settled down 
had to so at the edge of existing village clusters. As intermarriage increased, 
they were soon culturally integrated but at the same time became agents of 
the ongoing Turkification. As identity is strongly conceptualised as the result 
of common residence, this is not perceived of changing ones group affilia-
tion. at the same time, tajiks or Uzbeks from other parts of the country or 
beyond are perceived as being more distant. the dominant cultural schema is 
thus that people adopt the language and customs of their social environment 
– and therefore may change their identity during their lifetime rather than 
being determined by birth.
the situation in the neighbouring oasis of Khorezm is rather different. Re-
search had concentrated on the district of Xo‘jayli, today part of the autono-
mous Republic of Karakalpakistan. Here, turkification had been more or less 
completed by the thirteenth century and today the region is characterised by 
the coexistence of various Turkic groups that all became official nationalities 
in soviet times, namely Kazaks, Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, and turkmens. in 
contrast to Bukhara, differences are clearly pronounced and assimilation in 
either direction only takes place on a low level. historically, the antagonism 
between the sedentary population and tribal groups played out very differ-
ently. livestock rearing was much more important than in Bukhara, as eco-
logical conditions allowed larger groups of pastoralists to settle down. this 
is reflected in traditional settlement patterns characterised by smaller hamlets 
Photo 3: A Kazak family in Xo’jayli district, southern Karakalpakistan (P. Finke, 2002)
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and individual homesteads spread over a larger area (Bregel 1999). Because 
these are usually mono-ethnic, this creates a physical distance between the 
various groups. in spite of the common turkic background, the linguistic 
situation is quite complex as the four main languages belong to different sub-
divisions, namely the Qipchaq, Oghuz and Qarluq branches. The situation 
is further complicated by the fact that the local Uzbek dialects show strong 
Qipchaq and Oghuz influences, respectively. This distinction in itself demar-
cates also a cultural boundary within the Uzbeks. Bilingualism does exist but 
usually people speak their respective language and expect the other one to 
understand it. more distinct, linguistically and culturally, are the turkmens 
and interaction with them is limited. Mixed marriages are rare, especially 
with the latter. All groups exhibit a distinct self-understanding and a sense of 
a unique history. ethnicity thus has a more primordial character here than in 
Bukhara. at the same time, particularly among the local Uzbeks, a regional 
identity is strongly developed.
the third site had been the district of marhamat in the southern Ferghana 
Valley, which has in the literature become a synonym for tensions and vio-
lence in Central Asia. This is primarily due to a series of bloody conflicts 
since the late 1980s, one of which was mentioned in the beginning of this 
paper, and the fact that the valley is divided rather arbitrarily among three 
successor states of the soviet union. in ethnic terms, the region today is 
profoundly Turkic, or indeed Uzbek, with sizeable scattered tajik pockets. 
the turkic groups, however, divide into a number of distinct entities. this 
includes official ones, like the Kyrgyz, as well as non-registered groups, sub-
Photo 4: wedding party in a village of jokchi Uzbeks, Qashqadaryo province
 (P. Finke, 2002)
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sumed within the larger category of Uzbek. Some of these consider them-
selves closer to tajiks than to other turkic speakers and are often labelled as 
‘pure’ (taza) Uzbeks. Others such as Qipchaq and turk, the latter probably 
descendants of tribes who arrived in pre-shaybanid times, have traditionally 
led an agro-pastoral livelihood thanks to a steppe zone in the interior of the 
valley and the nearby pasture areas in the surrounding mountains. although 
all of them speak standard Uzbek today, they are less part of the cultural 
mainstream, which is defined by ‘pure’ Uzbeks with tajiks as minor partners. 
Ethnically mixed marriages do exist and are in fact not uncommon between 
Uzbeks and tajiks. in contrast, marriages with Kyrgyz or former tribal Uz-
beks are discouraged due to their alleged nomadic background. the concep-
tualization of groups and boundaries is thus quite different from Bukhara 
and Khorezm. Here, it does make a difference for people whether someone is 
an Uzbek or a tajik, and switching languages is much less common. on the 
other hand, one can be a tajik, or a Kyrgyz, without speaking the language, 
a situation that would not make much sense in Bukhara. again a strong re-
gional identity exists that includes the neighbouring provinces in the valley, 
both within and beyond state boundaries, as well.
The final research site was the oasis around the twin cities of Shahrisabz and 
Kitob in the north-eastern part of Qashqadaryo province, the birth place of 
timur. this is a region of lush pastures and historically it was much easier for 
pastoralists to graze their herds in the vicinity of sedentary communities than 
in the other three sites. as a consequence, many of the Qipchaq-speakers that 
have invaded Uzbekistan since the sixteenth century and given their name to 
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the ethnic group of today have survived culturally and linguistically. as in 
the Ferghana Valley, the long sedentary Uzbeks often prefer interaction and 
marriages with tajiks rather than with turkic groups who had been engaged 
with pastoralism in the not too distant past. in contrast, however, the local ta-
jiks in Upper Qashqadaryo are a rather marginalised mountain population. At 
the same time, the inner-Uzbek division is far more pronounced than in any 
of the other sites, although there does not even exist a proper name to express 
it. in popular speech the former pastoralists are usually referred to as ‘joqchi-
lar’ (‘those who say joq’) after a consonant they pronounce decidedly than 
other Uzbeks – who are consequently called ‘yo’kchilar’ – when in initial 
position. the former, although the native tongue of the original Uzbeks, is 
neither officially recognised nor locally perceived as a distinct language, not 
even as a dialect, but rather as substandard linguistic behaviour. Bilingualism 
is therefore usually a one-way street towards standard Uzbek. The number 
of ethnically mixed marriages is apparently rather low but, again, those be-
tween tajiks and yo’kchi Uzbeks are regarded as more appropriate. Both are 
considered as forming the cultural mainstream while the joqchilar, as former 
nomads, are described as less civilised and rude. each of the groups is char-
acterised by somewhat distinct behaviours that are accepted but the more one 
acts like a yo’kchi the better and as the ethnicity of children is again decided 
on by residence more than by genealogy a change is possible.
the diasPoras
These earlier findings are tested and expanded in newly beginning research 
looking at Uzbek diasporas in four different neighbouring states. three of 
them, namely Kyrgyzstan, afghanistan and tajikistan, have in recent years 
experienced conflicts of varying scale, in which Uzbeks have been more or 
less strongly involved. Kazakstan, which so far has been spared from severe 
inter-ethnic tensions, will serve as a kind of control case. the aim is to com-
pare besides concepts of identity and patterns of inter-ethnic relations also 
cases of conflict and political mobilization in the name of ethnicity. it will 
be asked when, why and how ethnic differentiation becomes relevant for 
social and political action, how this is shaped by national politics and the 
distribution of resources, and how this influences individual behaviour and 
the composition of social networks on the ground. in particular, we intend to 
inquire on the relationship between strategic behaviour, social expectations, 
historical and political frameworks as well as cultural models that influence 
how people perceive the world and structure their interaction accordingly. 
another issue to be addressed is how the above described characteristics of 
Uzbekness, namely its adaptability and its attractiveness play out in minority 
situations as this represents an additional variable for issues of identity and 
Photo 5: On the market in Uzgen, Osh province. As with other cities in southern kyr-
gyzstan, the majority of the population here is Uzbeks. (P. Finke, 2001)
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inter-ethnic relations. People may view the state line both as an obstacle as 
well as an opportunity, depending on the specific situation and the options 
each side and systems may have to offer them.
The Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan is of particular interest in this regard. 
Living almost exclusively in the Ferghana Valley, they have been affected by 
some of the most violent inter-ethnic encounters in recent decades. with 14 % 
(ca. 650,000 individuals) they constitute the largest autochthonous minority 
in the country. only tajikistan has a higher proportion of ethnic Uzbeks. 
as in the other case studies, settlements concentrate in the border region to 
Uzbekistan, in the southern provinces of Osh and jalalabad. Both provincial 
capitals, the second- and the third-largest cities in the country, have in fact 
an Uzbek majority population. The two provinces are separated from the 
rest of the country by a series of mountain ranges, which are impassable 
for most of the winter. The local population, Uzbek as well as Kyrgyz, fre-
quently expresses a feeling of neglect by the central government. Tensions 
about resource distribution and access to political power have been reported, 
although it is unclear to what degree these are ethnic in nature. Some Uzbek 
intellectuals regard the cities of osh and jalalabad as a natural part of Uzbek-
istan but most locals on both sides of the border do not seem to bother much 
on this until recently. they rather complain about restricted access for kin 
visits and trading trips. But in many cases, the recent conflicts led to a change 
in local ethnic compositions as many Uzbeks left the predominantly Kyrgyz 
villages and moved to the regional centre, while the rural areas became more 
and more Kyrgyz in character.
Photo 6: a laqay chest 
maker in southern tajikistan 
the decoration show 
similarities with those on 
chests made by Kazaks in 
china (cf. Buri and Finke 
this volume)
(W. holzWarth, 2010)
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the Uzbeks in tajikistan also constitute a theme of particular importance 
within the project for several other reasons. Firstly, they form by far the larg-
est proportion of Uzbek diasporas in regard to the population of the respec-
tive country, namely 25 % (or 1.5 million), although the government’s deci-
sion to officially recognise groups like the Laqay, so far registered as Uzbeks, 
has decreased their proportion. The second reason is equally significant. Pre-
cisely because Uzbeks and tajiks share many cultural commonalities, the 
ethnic distinction is often ambiguous. For centuries, both groups lived side 
by side, with each of them sharply differentiating between the categories of 
lowlanders and highlanders rather than thinking much in ethnic or linguistic 
lines. in contrast to Kyrgyzstan, however, many of the Uzbeks in tajikistan 
– as tribally organised and/or Qipchaq speakers – belong to categories that 
would in Uzbekistan not form part of the mainstream culture. On average, 
Uzbeks seem to do relatively well within the national economy but as the rest 
of the population have been heavily affected by the civil war and its after-
math that hampered economic and political developments severely. a strong 
tajik nationalist discourse in independent tajikistan, along with the rising 
role of Tajik as national language challenges Uzbek identities.
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Uzbeks in Kazakstan number approximately 400’000, most of which live 
in the southernmost province around the cities of shymkent and turkestan. 
This is yet another example of central asia’s more problematic borders re-
gions. As with other field sites, this used to be one conjoint region. With a 
similarly mixed population on both sides, the region was highly disputed 
during the separation into two distinct republics in early soviet times. ka-
zaks demanded the city of tashkent to be theirs, as especially they dominated 
the neighbouring rural districts. on the other hand, Uzbeks considered areas 
north of the border, where the main population was Uzbek, as their histori-
cal possession. Both, shymkent and Turkestan contain significant Uzbek 
minorities and in some of the rural areas Uzbeks even form a local major-
ity. Officially, they enjoy minority rights such as school instruction in their 
native tongue, cultural associations, and political representation. in practice, 
a growing trend towards Kazakization is observable. Inter- ethnic relations 
tend to be peaceful and the diaspora in Kazakstan therefore also serves as a 
control case with the conflicts mentioned above. Still, some degree of com-
petition and mutual prejudices exists. In recent years, border crossings have 
become increasingly difficult, especially for citizens from Uzbekistan who 
are not issued exit permissions anymore. This has also impacted negatively 
on cross-border social relations. the reason is primarily a response to grow-
ing numbers of Uzbeks who take up work in Kazakstan, where wages are 
much higher, although reports about ruthless exploitation and almost slave-
like conditions of labour migrants have increased in recent years.2
statistics in afghanistan are notoriously unreliable so the proportion of Uz-
beks can only be estimated roughly. in total, they make up less than ten percent 
but being concentrated in the north of the country, they can locally represent the 
most numerous group. still, with close to three million individuals this makes 
them the largest of the four diasporas in absolute terms. since the 19th century, 
many Pashtuns settled in this region and colonised some of the best lands with 
the support of the central government. Partly for that reason, Uzbeks played an 
important role in the fight against the Taliban. As such, they often formed alli-
ance with local tajiks and others. again, ethnic distinctions are from clear-cut 
and especially the category tajik is of limited use in ordinary life. what is cru-
cial for the comparative aspect is that people in afghanistan were by and large 
unaffected by the national delimitation process in the early soviet period so that 
ethnic labels per se have a rather different meaning. in everyday life, other cat-
egorical divides, as between nomads and sedentaries or between sunni and shia, 
may still be more important. as a result of the war, however, the country seems 
to be undergoing a process of ethnicization (Schetter 2003).
2  at the same time, southern Kazakstan has also become a prime destination for 
Kazak return migrants originating from Uzbekistan (cf. also Buri and Finke this 
volume).
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eXPlaining diVersitY, choice and cognitiVe constraints
in theoretical perspective, this project combines classic approaches to ethnic-
ity, usually summarised under the umbrella of primordialism and situational-
ism, with ideas borrowed from rational choice theory, cognitive anthropol-
ogy and political economy. Following Barth and others, ethnic groups are 
not seen as natural entities and cultural differences may persist in spite of 
intensive social interaction among groups. For this reason, identity markers 
of an ethnic group are often most clearly articulated not in the ‘centre’ but at 
the group’s margins, where interaction with others is most intense, as in dias-
pora settings. thus, the main criterion becomes the self-ascription of actors 
to specific groups and recognition of this on the part of others.
as a consequence, ethnic boundaries are always exposed to individual 
shifts and active manipulations. Most significant is probably the linguistic 
choice. the current retreat of tajik and other minority languages is not so 
much actively enforced from above but the accumulation of individual de-
cisions made by parents for their children (in light of a cost-benefit ratio 
that is framed by state policies). this is by no means a new phenomenon. 
as mentioned, the adaptation of a sedentary and nontribal turkic-speaking 
identity – no matter how this might have been labelled at various times – has 
been a highly advantageous choice in central asian history for much of the 
past thousand years or so. Furthermore, bilingualism presumably has been 
advantageous for a long time, because of ongoing relationships with iranian-
speakers. in fact, the data indicates that Uzbeks indeed seem to have a larger 
pool of potential marriage partners than tajiks as the latter less often give 
their daughters to villages inhabited by people with a pastoralist background 
(Finke in press). on the other hand, as the case study of Khorezm indicates, 
in the absence of tajiks ‘Uzbekness’ lost its structural advantages and thus 
also its attractiveness.
The underlying hypothesis is thus that groups owe their existence to the 
benefits they can provide for individuals, in particular their ability to reduce 
transaction costs. they achieve this by constituting institutional frameworks 
within which people can make reasonable assumptions about future strate-
gies of other actors. groups attract new members when, in particular political 
environments, they are more successful than others in providing such frame-
works. as institutions, social groups also constitute a kind of charter or a set 
of general guidelines for proper behaviour both within and outside of their 
boundaries. as such, they prescribe particular forms of conduct (including 
linguistic behaviour). it is a precondition of the group’s ability to function 
that members are recognizable and predictable in their behaviour. In this 
case, the previous experiences of individuals within the group are to some 
degree applied to those members with whom no history of interaction exists. 
As institutions, their main function is to establish expectations about the fu-
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ture behaviour of other actors and to create some degree of predictability in 
social interaction (north 1990). at the same time, self-interested individuals 
always have the incentive to change institutional designs to promote their 
own interests (knight 1992; ensminger and knight 1997). any change of 
individual belonging or group boundaries may thus be seen as a disregard of 
institutional compliance and potentially a change of the overall framework. 
therefore, while people may often have good reasons for switching, others 
equally have an interest in preventing them to do so as any change in group 
size and power distribution will affect some others adversely.
a rigidly instrumentalist or rational choice approach, however, tends to 
underestimate the emotional strength that group membership may exert, ir-
respective of the factual degree of difference. ethnic boundaries often show 
remarkable stability, in spite of changes of personnel, and in many cases 
individuals retain their established identities, even in cases in which it would 
be both possible and advantageous to change them. To switch affiliation may 
involve substantial costs, and often risks cutting into existing networks, to 
the detriment of one’s own interests. in many situations, people are repelled 
by some of the new prescriptive behavioural patterns that would result from 
a change of group affiliation. In other cases such a switch may be prohibited 
or greatly hampered by the requirements that acceptance and membership in 
other groups entail, such as a tribal genealogy or, more generally, ideas about 
‘us’ and ‘them’. In addition to ‘exit’ costs there are ‘entrance’ costs, which 
also vary. Becoming an Uzbek involves less expense than, for example, be-
coming a Kyrgyz, because it does not necessitate an invention or manipula-
tion of genealogical ties that constitute lineage-based societies. other factors 
that may hamper a change of group affiliation are ideological ones, e. g., per-
ceptions of superiority or backwardness. any model of identity is thus also 
based on people’s cognitive models, or schemas, which are transmitted as 
part of socialization. And as the property of individuals, identities still have 
to be recognised by others to make them meaningful. however, whether and 
how external ascriptions become internalised – influencing human behaviour 
and creating an emotional attachment to social groups or categories on the 
part of the individual – must be explained rather than taken for granted.
as cultural models, or schemas, ideas about ethnic groups and boundaries 
are ultimately properties of an individual, but are shared to a large degree by 
those who have experienced a similar socialization. They build on memories 
of past events and are activated when specific situations are encountered, 
to which they provide the interpretative frame (d’andrade 1996). the im-
ages of a ‘typical’ Uzbek, Kazak or Russian are schemas that people uncon-
sciously have in mind most of the time when they interact with each other. 
these schemas are again made up of connected sub-schemas: the one for 
ethnicity or for a particular ethnic group also activates ideas about intelligi-
bility, religious affiliation, marriageability, trustworthiness and the like. How 
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detailed and extensive the connectedness of the schema for a particular other 
is depends to a large degree on the frequency of encounters. in contrast to 
claims made by evolutionary psychologists, however, the insights gained in 
Uzbekistan do not indicate a universal primordialism in the human brain.3 on 
the contrary, ideas about social groups and boundaries appear to be culture-
specific. This was demonstrated by the opposing models of a territorial ver-
sus genealogical concept of identity. These two models are, of course, first 
and foremost analytical categories and do not necessarily present themselves 
in clear-cut opposition in real-life settings.
In the context of Uzbekistan – with the possible exception of Khorezm 
– schemas about appropriate behaviour are primarily grounded in an under-
standing of locality. Those who originate from the same place are expected to 
be and act similarly. therefore, a local Tajik and a local Uzbek may represent 
the same schema. at the same time, putative co-ethnics from different prov-
enance not only behave differently, they are expected to do so. This is very 
different from the ‘Kazak’ model, where a strong belief exists that everyone 
between the caspian sea and the altay mountains speaks and acts more or 
less the same, irrespective of the actual closeness or distinctiveness of behav-
ioural patterns. Differences are conceptualised as the result of outside influ-
ences (such as Russification, Uzbekization or Sinicization) and understood 
as deviations from the norm, not as part of the basic make-up as in the Uzbek 
case. of course, both these perceptions are social constructs but both may 
also become self-fulfilling prophecies to some extent.
What is more, cost-benefit ratios of group membership are never calcu-
lated within a neutral space; rather, they are strongly influenced by political 
configurations. In particular, the state is able to affect the attractiveness of 
belonging to a specific group tremendously and can also increase the costs 
of leaving and entering groups by legal provisions and ideological manipula-
tions as shows the case of Uzbekistan. Cultural schemas, however, cannot be 
changed and manipulated arbitrarily; they have an impact on both the con-
ceptualization of national ideologies by members of political elites and their 
reception ‘on the ground.’ thus, local identities and concepts of the nation 
state stand in a kind of dialectic relationship with one another. the formation 
of an ethnic group may have the character of a politically induced process 
and of an ‘invented tradition’, but it has to be grounded in some historical 
configurations in order to achieve plausibility and legitimacy.
The definition of boundaries, of majorities and minorities, all impose costs 
on actors that influence their decision-making process. The same is true for 
state-supported views of proper linguistic or cultural behaviour. a manipula-
tion may go as far as preventing people from making decisions by exclud-
ing all but one option, though this does not in itself determine the identity 
3   For such a view see gil-white (2001).
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that they apply to themselves – people may follow rules without necessarily 
believing in them. Furthermore, as schemas constitute the background infor-
mation upon which identities are based, they are not always conscious and 
thus not open to arbitrary manipulation. it is probably no coincidence that 
the concept of nation state is different in Uzbekistan than in other parts of 
the region and correlates with general ideas about group affiliation and the 
transmission of personhood that are, to a large degree, shared by the national 
elites and the rest of the population.
culturally as well as biologically the Uzbeks of today are primarily the 
descendants of the representatives of the sedentary cultures who originated 
in this territory, rather than the children of former nomads from the steppes. 
This may appear to confirm the government position (and indeed, the earlier 
Soviet explanation of Uzbek ethnogenesis). The argument here is, however, 
that this is not so much the result of political calculus but of elites sharing 
an understanding of ethnic processes as a basic cognitive model that is the 
product of socialization with everyone else. This is not to say that identity 
politics are not present in the manipulation of ethnic boundaries. however, 
such politics are played out within the framework of a shared cultural model 
that defines how humans are believed to become affiliated with one another.
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FulBe and uZBeks comPared
(Günther Schlee in collaboration With Martine Guichard)
Profile
Until 1999, Günther Schlee was Professor of Social Anthropology at the Uni-
versity of Bielefeld, having studied anthropology, romance languages and 
general linguistics in Hamburg. He received his doctorate for research on the 
belief and social systems of the Rendille, an ethnic group in northern Kenya. 
Alongside widespread fieldwork trips in Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan, he was 
also guest lecturer in Padang (Sumatra) and at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes 
en Science Sociales in Paris. Typical of the research of Günther Schlee is 
the ‘inter-ethnic’ procedure and the combining of historical, sociological and 
philological methods.
The research of the Department ‘Integration and Conflict’ is based on the 
principle of cluster formation, not exclusively1 but overwhelmingly. to have 
several researchers working in the same region is meant to facilitate con-
trolled comparisons, that is comparisons between variations that are limited 
in one way or another. unlike comparisons between highly different situa-
tions, comparing cases with only a limited number of differences while other 
variables can be kept constant, allows us to discern which changes in some 
variables entail alterations in other variables. looking at variation and co-
variation yields knowledge about how things are connected, which is the 
kind of knowledge theories are made of.
Since the founding of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in 1999, 
research focussed particularly on three regions: west africa, northeast africa, 
and central asia. west and northeast africa have meanwhile been connected 
as research areas by a number of projects, first the research by Andrea Behrends 
on refugees in the eastern chad and then also by regine Penitsch on darfur2. 
the recently completed project Travelling Models in Conflict Management: A 
Comparative Research and Network Building Project in Six African Countries 
(Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Sudan), financed by the 
1    Exceptions are a number of classic, well-documented conflicts such as Northern 
Ireland (Olaf Zenker 2013) or the Balkans (Rozita Dimova), whose inclusion  
aims to create connections (via criticisms, supplements, or other) to the dominant 
discourses of the discipline. complementary diaspora studies were and are being 
conducted in countries of two regional clusters, namely west africa: ghana (Boris 
nieswand 2011) and north east africa: somalia (günther and isir schlee 2012), 
nuer (christiane Falge 2009), and anywaa (dereje Feyissa 2011).
2   Behrends and schlee 2009
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Volkswagen Foundation, also includes projects on darfur3 and one concerning 
the Chad with participation of the Department ‘Integration and Conflict’. 
the three regional project clusters show similarities not only for internal 
comparisons but also for comparisons among them. they are not arbitrarily 
scattered across the globe, nor do they aim for particular contrast. the three 
research regions have a number of things in common. much of their territories 
lies in the arid belt of the old world, islam plays an important role as either the 
religion of the group under study or of their relevant others, and they are or 
were being shaped by the interaction between nomads and the settled popula-
tion.4 It is thus reasonable to use research findings based on African examples 
first as tentative generalisations to be tested in central asia, and vice versa.
while the department itself provides a framework for interregional com-
parisons, the work of colleagues from other departments or work groups at 
the institute also provide inspiration. in a previous report5, Brian donahoe 
(siberian studies centre of the institute) and i looked at the role of intereth-
nic clan relations in tuva in comparison to east africa (donahoe/schlee 
2003), another contribution together with Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi (Depart-
ment ‘socialist and postsocialist eurasia’ of the institute) uses african and 
Asian examples of pilgrimages (Kehl-Bodrogi/schlee, 2007). other such 
department-overlapping topics are revivalism movements (Pelkmans/Vaté/
Falge 2005) and transnational relations (glick schiller et al. 2005).
this contribution’s topic originates from comparative research on africa 
and central asia. its aim is to compare Fule and Uzbeks and to present re-
search findings, on the basis of which the theoretical framework on identity, 
ethnicity, and interethnic relations can be further developed.
At first glance, the comparison between Fule and Uzbeks seems arbitrary. 
One might say, everything can be compared to anything, but, as explained above, 
3    mutasim Bashir ali hadi is the project researcher, musa adam abdul-jalil the attending  
supervisor, and richard rottenburg the german partner. richard rottenburg is  
a professor at the institute for social and cultural anthropology of the martin-luther- 
University Halle-Wittenberg, a former Max Planck Fellow at our Institute, and this 
programme’s leader. other projects are (in parentheses the researcher/localsupervisor/ 
and german partner): sierra leone (sylvanus nicholas spencer, lena thompson/
joe a. d. alie, ahmed dumbuya/jacqueline knörr), liberia (sylvanus nicholas 
spencer, lena thompson/joe a. d. alie, ahmed dumbuya/Veronika Fuest), chad 
(laguerre dionro djerandi/khalil alio/andrea Behrends), ethiopia (dejene 
gemechu/tadesse Berisso/günther schlee), south Africa (Tinashe Pfigu/Kees van 
der waal/thomas kirsch)/Behrends et al. (eds), forthcoming.
4    this is the topic of the special research group 586 ‘difference and integration. 
interaction between nomadic and settled forms of life in the civilisations of the old  
world’, which the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology takes part in  
(project B6 [Schlee], researcher Kirill Istomin) next to the martin-luther-university  
Halle-Wittenberg and the University of Leipzig.
5    older reports are not rendered obsolete by new publications, rather they are often  
complimentary. all reports are still in print and can also be accessed via our website  
http://www.eth.mpg.de.
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better insights can be gained from controlled comparison, in which not all vari-
ables change at once so that it becomes impossible to discern how they are in-
terrelated. comparisons should thus always include a number of similarities or 
constants. Precisely such similarities exist between the Fule and Uzbeks:
 ▫  1. in both cases there is a differentiation level far above the clan or the vil-
lage but below the ethnic classification as ‘Uzbeks’ or ‘Fule’. this level 
may be called that of sub-ethnic groups.
 ▫ 2. Practically all Uzbeks and all Fule are muslims, at least mominally. 
 ▫  3. despite this fact, particularly the real or ascribed levels of religious or-
thodoxy serve to distinguish different sub-ethnicities. 
 ▫  4. Both Fule and Uzbeks are scattered across numerous nation states, al-
beit for different reasons. Fule groups crossed the entire width of the af-
rican continent on their pilgrimages to mecca before the modern nation 
states even existed. After the Nation states has come into existence, these 
same migrations of pilgrims, nomads and wage labourers acquired a trans-
national character. Uzbeks, on the other hand, have a long sedentary tradi-
tion. their scattered presence is mainly the result of their settlement area 
being divided among different soviet republics, which went on to form 
different independent states. So, with some simplification, one can say that 
the presence of these groups in different nation states is due to two quite 
different processes, namely that the Fulɓe crossed boundaries while in the 
Uzbek case it was the boundaries which crossed the Uzbeks.
 ▫  5. Both Fule and Uzbeks are ethnic groups at the edge of language fam-
ilies. The linguistic next of kin of the Fule are the wolof and serer in 
senegambia, together with whom they form the west-atlantic branch of 
the niger-kordofanian language family.6 across africa, the Fule live as 
neighbours with groups belonging to different branches of their own lan-
guage family or ones whose language has no ties to Fulfulde at all, such 
as afro-asian (Berber, hausa, arabic, oromo) or nilo-saharan (kanuri, 
Dinka, etc.) languages. Some variants of Uzbek are Turkic languages in-
fluenced by an iranian (indo-european) substrate. the phonology and the 
absence of vocal harmony suggest that these are varieties of turki which 
developed while spoken by Iranian speakers. We will return to the coexist-
ence of language and language variants and their respective prestige in the 
context of Peter Finke’s work (see below).
the Fule research in Halle is based on DFG financed projects (‘Eth-
nizitäten in neuen Kontexten’ [schlee 186/9-1, project span 1996-1998] und 
‘Ethnizitäten im Vergleich’ [schlee 186/8-1, project span 1995-1997]) that 
were realised at the University of Bielefeld. The first of the projects led the 
6   according to greenberg 1963.
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author to the Sudan for fieldwork. The second project was in the hands of 
martine guichard und Youssouf diallo.7 guichard’s research covered Benin 
and cameroon, while diallo worked on the ivory coast and Burkina Faso. 
The theoretical outset for these projects was to find particularly significant 
test cases for Barth’s ethnicity theory among populations, whose settlement 
area is scattered over great distance and who have a history of migration.
since Barth’s Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969) it is established that 
the most concise mould of an ethnicity is not to be found at its centre or 
among its typical members but rather at its edges. almost all older, classic 
studies in ethnology and social anthropology, with few remarkable excep-
tions such as Leach (1954), followed the monographic tradition of examining 
the respective foreign culture as a balanced, functional system represented by 
its typical members, thus examining the system as it was ‘meant’ to be. This 
research tradition provided a direction that always strove to find the centre 
or supposed centre of an ethnicity. since Barth, we now know that ethnicity 
plays a relatively minor role in ethnically homogenous areas and that the 
study of ethnicities yields far better results when conducted in border areas, 
where a particular ethnicity is faced with other ethnicities.8
Reflecting in these processes of border demarcation, a number of interesting 
analogies to biology arise. Biological processes may take place in a differ-
ent medium, i. e. the genetic transmission of information, than learned and 
acquired culture, but from an abstract and structural point of view there are 
similar processes involved. For the differentiation of single species out of a 
heterogeneous population with yet ineffective species barriers it was found 
that sub-populations near borders exhibited the greatest differences in cer-
tain communicative characteristics such as plumage colour or song.9 another 
seemingly important aspect for ethnic differentiation in human culture, name-
ly economic specialisation (overlapping of ethnicity and occupational castes), 
also has a formal equivalent in biology in the form of the ecological niche. 
that is why biological metaphors are often used to describe the social sphere.
ethnicity is articulated the edges of an ethnic group through its dealings with 
other ethnic groups. this process may be antagonistic or take on a cooperative 
form such as the partitioning of occupational niches and different specialisations. 
the material, which ethnicity is made of, is culture, itself a sediment of history. 
7    For previous presentations of these projects see schlee 1997a.
8    the following contributions to recent ethnological and social anthropological research 
support this finding: Anderson 1983; Appadurai 1990; Asad 1986; Ashkenasi 1990;  
Balibar/wallerstein 1990; Beck 1989; Braukämper 1992; clifford 1988; dench 1986, 
elias/scotson 1990; elwert 1989; engman et al. 1992; gellner 1983; giddens 1985;  
Giesen 1991; Glazer/Moynihan 1975; Heckmann 1992; Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983; 
Horowitz 1985; Hurreiz/ÝAbdel Salam 1989; Lentz 1988; McCready 1983; Mies/
streck/theis 1985; o’Brien 1986; roosens 1989; schlee 1989, 1994; a. smith 1981, 
1993; Tetzlaff 1993; Waldmann/elwert 1989.
9    see white 1978.
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the passing of time creates ever more new events, which are selected and shaped 
by tradition and thus provide an image of their past for each human group and 
sub-group. the passing of time effects the development of language and causes 
gradual or sudden changes also in other sub-systems of culture.
As ethnicities are shaped at their borders, we can expect that new borders 
will create and shape new ethnicities. according to this theory, a collective 
identity that has formed in a specific surrounding and neighbourhood and is 
then transferred to a different locale cannot persist without changes. rather, 
the characteristics of ethnicity must be newly formed in the new context after 
a migration, regardless of whether the migration is a result of flight or eco-
nomic or religious reasons (pilgrim groups who settled in new areas). new 
surroundings require different means of differentiation. this is not the case for 
individual assimilation. However, if a group continues to exist as a group in a 
new context, this can only be achieved by adapting to the new circumstances, 
and the forms of adaptation must be different from those of already present 
groups and develop their own specialisations and symbolic representations. 
thus, the real test case for Barth’s theory is an ethnicity in a new context.
For my own research, i chose an area along the Blue nile in the sudan, 
where almost the entire population has a migration background, among oth-
ers (arabs, oromo, etc.) these are different groups of Fule. I specifically 
wanted to study a region and not a group or ethnic group, as was already de-
tailed in the dFg project application. the research questions were dependent 
on the ethnic articulations to be found in that region and could thus not be 
specified beforehand. guichard’s and diallo’s research was based on a very 
general ethnic categorisation: i. e. to examine Fule in different contexts. The 
numerous different contexts, in which the Fule – and also the Uzbeks – live, 
make them such interesting objects of controlled comparative research.
in the sudan, the valley of the Blue nile was chosen as research area. over 
the past centuries and in particular also the last decades, this valley with its 
newer and older irrigation cultures has been the destination (or endpoint, if 
the intended destination lay elsewhere) of many migrations. the same is true 
for the upper stretch of the Atbara and Gash rivers, though this text cannot 
cover them in detail.
west african migration to the eastern sudan has been going on for centu-
ries. the most recent immigrants, however, also comprise many west afri-
cans, so that there are different groups of west african descent who may face 
relations as established groups and newcomers. Gallabat (al-Qalabat), to the 
southeast of Gedaref (al-Qadarif), is a community of long-settled ‘Takrur’10 
from west africa.11 Duffield (1979: 283f.) distinguishes between an early 
10    on the origins of the name, see Braukämper 1992: 92; Krieger 1952: 87; Ýumar 
al-naqar 1969: 365ff.
11    see Ýumar al-naqar 1989.
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immigration wave from Bornu (the so-called ‘Beriberi’) and of ‘Fulani’ (also 
Fulfulde-speaking west africans or Fule) that lasted from the late 17th to 
the mid-19th centuries and a more recent immigration wave at the beginning 
of the 20th century, which was understood as a hijra, the ‘holy flight’ from 
the rule of non-believers, and was connected to the British conquest of the 
hausa-Fulani emirates in north nigeria. said hijra took place at almost ex-
actly the same time as the anglo-egyptian recapture of the sudan from the 
Mahdiyya, and so it was a flight from the British in one place that led right 
into their arms in another. For the early migration movement, the so-called 
Muwalli-d[un] (the ‘ones born [on the land]’) Duffield differentiates between 
groups of nomadic herders and groups of scholars, who moved up quickly 
in the ranks of officials at the Sudanese ruling courts or received lands for 
settlement and thus strengthened islam along its border regions.12 however, 
Duffield completely excludes the strictly nomadic Fule, the ‘umbororo’ 
(mbororo or Fule-mbororo).
historic accounts of this earlier migration wave suggest that the west af-
ricans often entered the local societies ‘from above’ or were able to find very 
comfortable niches, while the immigrants from the last century – after the 
hijra at the end of the mahdiyya – had a very different lot. at some point 
during the first decades of the new turkiyya, the anglo-egyptian administra-
tion, the attitudes towards immigrants must have changed, perhaps due to the 
settlement of large numbers13 of west african agricultural workers in the new 
irrigation areas. as west africans in “older traditions often [appear] almost 
as culture bearers”14, e. g. in a number of episodes quoted by Braukämper 
199215, the term ‘Fellata’, presently used for west african immigrants, no 
longer carries any prestige with it.16
12    Braukämper confirms this pattern for darfur (1992: 193): “sultan ahmad Bukr  
(ca. 1700 – 1720) pursued a deliberate policy of enticing muslims from west africa  
with material incentives and privileges and particularly of convincing mecca 
pilgrims to stay and settle in order to strengthen islam in darfur and very likely also  
his own power in the ruling system.”
13   Braukämper (1992: 96) explains: “In the six regions of southern darfur, east of the 
Nuba Mountains, the Gezira, along the Blue nile, the area of el-gedaref, and the 
gash delta, the number of immigrants rose from about 30,000 in 1912 to 250,000 
in 1947. recent estimates suggest that more than one million inhabitants of the 
republic of the sudan are of west african descent.”
14   Braukämper (1992: 96) names the Fulɓe wave one of the two big waves of islam 
proliferation in the area of the sudan. the opposite (east-west) ‘afro-arabic’ 
wave is more significant in the eastern Sudan. And yet the first wave has only been 
insufficiently considered so far.
15   Fulɓe as proliferators of islam in wadai: Braukämper (1992: 86f.); settled by darfur’s  
ruler in the early 18th century in order to strengthen islam: ibid., s. 87; torooɓe – 
Fulɓe well-known as Quran scholars: ibid., S. 90.
16   on the changing connotation of the term: “the kanuri term Fellata, which the 
indigenous population of darfur came to use for the Fulbe, certainly did not comprise 
the pejorative connotation of ‘foreigners from the west’ back then [beginning of 
Photo 1: Fulɓe-Mbororo near Damazin in East sudan  (haSSan Schlee, 1996)
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the differing acceptance of immigrants at different times might also be 
seen in connection with the assimilation speed. “the striking difference be-
tween the muwallid and modern Fulani settlers is the rapid indigenisation 
of the former. By the end of the 19th century the muwallid had, in general, 
lost their original languages and culture. the reason for this relatively rapid 
indigenisation is that in many cases the muwallid secured their livelihoods 
as clerical or religious figures, thus their absorption and reproduction of the 
cultural milieu in which they settled was a necessary factor to their social 
existence. Modern Fulani settlers, on the other hand, not only came from a 
wider range of social backgrounds but they settled in a system in which tribal 
divisions were purposely elaborated and maintained by the colonial regime” 
(Duffield 1979: 284 according to Ýabdel ghaffar 1976: 17-26).
however, cultural assimilation is not solely dependent on the acceptance 
an immigrant group finds in its host culture. In case of the Sudanese Fule-
mbororo, strictly nomadic herders of proverbial mobility, one isolating fac-
tor next to their low standing as people of the ‘bush’ certainly is their own 
exclusive attitude. They place little value in the acceptance by others. They 
also show no interest in the cattle of their neighbours. as long as their red 
and black long-horned zebus17 remain pure-bred and distinguishable, lost 
the 18th century]. it was most likely during this time period, when the Fulbe in darfur  
adopted the term as their ethnonym.” (Braukämper 1992: 193)
17   these are called kuuri in the sudan. the black-and-white sheep of the Fulɓe-mbororo, 
called ‘uda’, are also a breed of their own. (Braukämper 1992: 98) In other parts  
of the Fulɓe area, the typical large zebus of the Fulɓe are being cross-bred with other 
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animals or ones embezzled or stolen by their neighbours can be easily iden-
tified. More mobile than the Arabic-speaking Baggara cattle nomads, the 
Fule-mbororo have, over the last couple of generations, gradually moved 
from their west african regions of origin across the sudanese belt to the 
ethiopian highland, where an eastern drift overlays the seasonal north-
south-rhythm. Their external characteristics (“[…] blue face tattoos, often 
colourful cloths and braided hairstyles for the men, bows and poisoned ar-
rows as main weapon” [Braukämper 1992: 98]) make them a visible foreign 
body in the area.
concerning the Fule-mbororo, the research conducted from Bielefeld 
found its continuation in halle in a joint project with dereje Feyissa on 
the Fule-mbororo on both sides of the ethiopian-sudanese border (Fey-
issa/schlee, 2009) and in the dissertation of el-hadi ibrahim osman at the 
university of khartoum, which the author also has supervised. the project 
title is The pastoral Fulbe in the Funj Region: a study of the interaction of 
state and society (see also schlee/Abu-Manga 2001; Max Planck Institute 
for social anthropology report 1999-2001, p. 59f.; http://www.eth.mpg.de/
subsites/schlee_tagebuch_02/index.html).
some Fule in the republic of the sudan, and in particular certain Fule-
mbororo moving far into ethiopia on their seasonal tracks, can be seen as 
the extreme eastward extension of the Fule, while a different movement of 
Fulfulde-speaking populations can also be witnessed at the same time. this 
latter movement also has a tendency that independently influences different 
Fule groups in different places, i. e. the southward movement into the semi-
humid zone. This tendency is represented by the next regional example, the 
Ivory Coast, and comparisons to other West African examples of Fule mi-
grations are to follow. as mentioned before, this is Youssouf diallo’s project, 
the outline of which and its results i will summarise here.
Fule living in ivory coast come from mali and Burkina Faso (mostly the 
region around Barani). their migration to the ivorian wet savannahs (de-
partements in the north of the country) represents a phenomenon as it only 
really began in the 1960s and only gained significance due to the worsening 
ecological conditions in the sahel since the early 1980s, which is also when 
the ivory coast increased measure to end their dependency on imported for-
eign meat. since these Fule migrated to the ivory coast, they mostly settled 
close to the senufo, a group that is rumoured to have a pastoral past18 but 
who are mostly farmers today. considering this supposed past and the fact 
that the senufo often own cattle, the research focussed on the significance of 
breeds in order to raise the resistance towards the tsetse fly. This is of particular 
importance for the recent southward movement of the Fulɓe into areas with denser 
vegetation. Very often, Fulɓe insist that part of their herd remains pure-bred.  
(see diallo 1995)
18   see roussel 1965: 73.
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cattle breeding in the inter- and inner-ethnic discourse. It was thus examined, 
if the Fule, who are still strongly associated with the label ‘nomad herders’, 
use their advanced knowledge about cattle breeding as an important distin-
guishing characteristic to differentiate themselves from the senufo and, if so, 
which specific skills are utilised in this context.
another research focus was the role of religion as a determining dimen-
sion of collective identity and as an important factor for the assimilation at a 
locale that is dominated by other ethnic groups. concerning the peaceful in-
tegration of immigrating muslim Fule into new contexts, there is evidence 
suggesting that such processes are most easily achieved in villages of islam-
ised groups.19 This assumption was confirmed in the field. It could also be 
proven that islam is used as an important distinguishing element, when the 
long-settled groups are ‘animistic’, as the administrative jargon puts it. at 
the same time, the particularities of their own mould of islam undoubtedly 
play a role in the relations to other muslims. these particularities persist be-
cause the ivorian Fule continue to maintain contact with the islamic schol-
ars of the religious centre from where the early proliferation of the tijjaniyya 
brotherhood began originating from the Barani region.
in Burkina Faso, where the Fule presence dates back to the late 17th and 
early 18th century, the processes of assimilation into the autochthone popula-
tion were much more diverse than in ivory coast. research in the Boobola 
province (in the west of the country) showed that such processes involved 
certain Fule groups more than others. this concerns particularly the sidie 
and sangare, namely members of those clans who created the nation-like 
entities Barani and dokui during the 19th century, which lay within the in-
fluence sphere of Maasina (mali). among the Fule of these clans, we can 
see similar tendencies as with the leading groups in nigeria. Following the 
claims to rule, the members of the new elite adapted their cultural character-
istics to those of the population they now dominated.20 For the Boobola prov-
ince this meant Fule in leading positions often becoming Bwa and Bobo. 
the identity change was effected by using the language and adopting the 
customs and traditions of the subdued population as well as through exoga-
mous marriage. in some cases, the ethnonym and/or patronym were changed, 
sometimes also the clan name.
later than the elite members were ‘ordinary’ cattle breeders from the 
sidie and sangare clans accepted into the Bwa and Bobo societies and then 
became weavers and farmers. For these Fule, the identity change and ensu-
ing settlement was certainly facilitated by impoverishment and the loss of 
19   See Frantz 1978.
20   see m. smith (1960) on nigeria. one main difference to the situation in nigeria lies  
in that the Fulɓe’s claim to rule in Boobola is not justified through islam but 
legitimised by the control over the wells (see diallo 1997).
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their herds. such a change is also often a sign that the Fule had once been 
welcomed by the farmers and had had good relations with them. in light of 
this fact and the on-going importance of the interdependence of neighbour-
ing ethnic groups, it would thus be beneficial not to consider farmers and cat-
tle herders as solely competiting groups engaged in rivalries over resources 
but also as complementing each other. It is, for example, well-known that the 
Bwa and Bobo, who consider investing in cattle a sort of savings account and 
sign of wealth, often prefer to have their cattle tended by Fule. Next to this 
case of complementarity, diallo found other forms of dependency of differ-
ent dyads of professional groups while examining their everyday relations, 
including the ritualised joking behaviour between them.21
martine guichard followed the same approach in Benin, where the Fule 
represent an ethnic minority. they are neither well-integrated into the na-
tion state nor the market economy, the majority of them living in Borgou, a 
north-eastern province of the country. in this province we can see that both 
agro-pastoralists and their immediately neighbouring farmers, the Bariba, 
made otherness the official code of their interethnic communication and they 
accentuate it with the rule that individual relations between members of the 
groups must remain in the ‘hidden’.22 Furthermore, Fule living in this region 
marry almost exclusively among themselves and hardly ever adopt others 
into their ranks. they do differ from a large Fule group that Guichard ex-
amined comparatively in northern cameroon, i. e. the group whose members 
sometimes call themselves ‘Fule-huya’.
guichard’s research project in the south-eastern part of the adamaoua 
province (Departement Mbéré) compared two Fule sub-ethnicities. the 
first one is characterised by strongly hierarchical socio-political organisa-
tion forms. considering historical aspects, they can be sub-divided into two 
status groups that are subsumed here under the category Fule-huya. today, 
they both claim to have had a large part in the jihaad that resulted in the 
founding of the sokoto caliphate and the adamawa-emirate. Furthermore, 
they had a collective identity that held high prestige for a long time, so that 
many islamised non-Fule and converts from other ethnic groups once sub-
ordinated under the cover of islam also used said identity for themselves. 
since the mid-1980s the compatibility of being muslim and maintaining 
one’s own identity as a non-Fule have grown in northern cameroon, but 
21   Youssouf diallo supervised a number of articles on this topic published in the 
journal Zeitschrift für Ethnologie (volume 131/2, 2006). the collection includes 
contributions from alice Bellagamba, Youssouf diallo, sten hagberg, and tal 
tamari.
22   this applies also to personal friendships, a topic that Guichard researched extensively  
over the course of the Volkswagen Foundation financed interdisciplinary project 
(‘Freundschaft und Verwandtschaft: Zur Unterscheidung und Relevanz zweier 
Beziehungssysteme’, see guichard 2007).
Photo 2: misaje, north west cameroon 
in honour of two Fulɓe-Mbororo children who successfully finished their Qur’anic 
school, a festival is celebrated on which occasion Fulɓe-mbororo and hausa children 
recite Qur'an passages. (M. Pelican, 2001)
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there are other groups who increasingly adapt to the Fule-huya. these 
are the jafun, aku and woaae, also Fule sub-groups that are known as 
Fule-mbororo23 and are often associated with pastoral nomadism and ru-
dimentary islamisation. the equalisation of the Fule-mbororo with being 
half-hearted muslims is also fuelled by the assumption that they did not 
take part in the jihaad. this assumption is problematic as it is based on the 
evolutionist idea that islam succeeded paganism. this two-tiered idea has 
been refuted a number of times24 and it cannot be denied that syncretist and 
re-paganisation processes took place in many areas.25 there is also ample 
evidence that the general distinction between the Fule-huya and Fule-
mbororo as favouring islamisation or paganisation, respectively, lacks a 
historical basis. still, the research area of the Fule-mbororo displays a less-
er degree of islamisation than that of the Fule-huya. this can, as guichard 
noted, be seen as a sign that re-paganisation processes were quite common 
among the Fule-mbororo.26
23   in northern cameroon, the category Fulɓe-mbororo is far more inclusive than in 
the sudan.
24   See Bah 1993: 69; Bonfiglioli 1988; Hiskett 1984; Labatut 1973: 31; Last 1987; 
stenning 1959: 87 ff., 1980: 196.
25   see amselle 1990: 181-208.
26   see Braukämper 1971: 111.
Photo 3: north cameroon
Before her moving to her husband’s residence, wedding gifts of the newly wed woman 
of the Fulɓe-Mbororo group are exhibited. (M. Guichard, 2004)
Photo 4: on the day of the naming. a ritual shaving of a one week-old baby of the 
Fulɓe-mbororo group. (M. Guichard, 2004)
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islam also plays an important role in identity change dynamics that are ex-
pressed in the increasing orientation at the Fule-huya sub-ethnicity. these 
‘huyaisation-’ of ‘transfuleisation’ processes, supported by poor and well-
off Fule-mbororo with a tendency towards sedentarisation, favour restricted 
freedom of movement for women. due to the seclusion of women, such pro-
cesses lead to changes in the gender-specific earning possibilities and to sig-
nificant need for economic-ecological adaptation: a shift from predominantly 
dairy to meat production in cattle husbandry. another characteristic of these 
transfuleisation processes is the hardly modified marriage practices: inter-
marriage between Fule-mbororo and Fule-huya is still very rare. however, 
Fule-huya often marry islamised non-Fule or converts, who underwent 
huyaisation processes, thus displaying a quite particular assimilation policy. 
this policy furthers the integration of ethnic others much more than that of 
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ethnic kin, with whom the Fule-huya still share classic elements of col-
lective identity such as language, real or supposed common descent, and 
belonging to sunni islam. guichard’s analysis of assimilation processes also 
showed that Huyaisation is not dependent on a close spatial proximity to 
the Fule-Huya. In some cases, the proximity to a sub-group of the Fule-
Mbororo, whose members exhibit a significant tendency towards huyaisa-
tion, has a far greater influence than co-residence with the Fule-huya. one 
example are the aku, whose huyaisation was and is actually realised by way 
of jafunisation.
another focus of guichard’s research was the ‘weak’ side of the Fule. For 
the Fule in northern Benin and Borgou, who feature an egalitarian organisa-
tion like the Fule-Mbororo and are not a particularly conflict-capable group 
in the sense of schubert et al. (1993), it has been noted that they cultivate 
such a ‘weak’ side.27 a comparison of the sub-ethnic Fule groups in north-
ern cameroon should reveal whether this ‘culture of weakness’ is the result 
of a long experience with political and economic marginalisation28 or rather 
a general part of the pastoral ethos. Guichard’s results confirm that the ‘Fule 
archetype’ (amselle 1990) and thus the image of the warring Pullo (singular 
of Fule) needs to be revisited. among the Fule-huya, who nurse their ji-
haad tradition and claim dominance and superiority over the Fule-mbororo 
due to their more orthodox Islam, the element of ‘powerlessness’ also plays 
an important role for their internal and external image. In common with the 
Fule-mbororo and the Fule of northern Benin, the Fule-huya also often 
emphasise or even pretend ignorance and incompetence in order to better in-
fluence the actions of others as well as claiming that such forms of displayed 
weakness represent a Fule specific kind of sociability.
Next to our own research, we draw on the results of others for the com-
parison. a workshop in Bielefeld, with the participants jean Boutrais, miriam 
de Bruijn, Christian Delmet, Han van Dijk, and José van Santen, led to the 
book L’ethnicité Peule dans des contextes nouveaux (diallo/schlee 2000). a 
DAAD financed student research project for the diplom studies in sociology 
in Bielefeld (wei-hsian chi, Boris nieswand, jens rabbe) provided the basis 
for the collective volume Ethnizität und Markt: Zur ethnischen Struktur von 
Viehmärkten in Westafrika (schlee 2004a), which also contains complimen-
tary contributions from jean Boutrais and michaela Pelican. Both works in-
clude chapters on comparative research but can only be mentioned here in ref-
erence. Next, I will turn to those works I supervised since 1999 in Halle/Saale.
Youssouf diallo‘s habilitation thesis Les Fulbe des espaces interstitiels: 
pastoralisme, migrations et identités (Burkina Faso – Côte d’Ivoire) (2004) 
27   see Boesen 1994, 1999; guichard 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 2000.
28   on the marginal position of the Fulɓe in northern Benin, see among others lombard  
1965 and Bierschenk 1990, 1997.
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examines interethnic relations and those between states and ethnic groups. 
although diallo avoids references to current political events, connections to 
topics of a high media presence and societal relevance are obvious. in (post-)
industrial immigration societies (of which germany was and is one, albeit it 
was long denied) there is a lively debate between those who equate integra-
tion with assimilation and those favouring a multicultural society29 in which 
inclusion in the political system and participation in economic life go hand-
in-hand with maintaining cultural differences.
On the basis of different West African examples displaying contrary and 
contrasting tendencies, the thesis discusses the relation of participation in 
state and governance, i. e. the integration in the village community and the 
preservation or abandonment of linguistic and other cultural features, in such 
a way that can also be a fruitful approach for other parts of the world.
The world comprises zones of great ethnic and linguistic homogeneity 
where one linguistic community or speakers of related languages take up 
large cohesive areas. these sometimes border on other such regions of this 
kind or on heterogeneous zones, where several language families and/or old 
branches of a single language family with significant differences are crowd-
ed together in a confined space.
in the Caucasus, the very high linguistic heterogeneity is explained by the 
landscape, i. e. the mountains that provide easily defendable areas of retreat 
and geographical communication barriers. another point of argument sup-
porting this explanation is the caucasus’ position between two seas and the 
resulting myriad of through roads. the sum of these factors does, however, 
not necessarily lead to linguistic heterogeneity, and other mountains are in-
deed less heterogeneous.
as the Caucasus is not the topic of this paper, the credibility of these explana-
tions is non-essential here. the Caucasus only serves as the exception from the 
remarkable lack theories. although many scholars theorised about the cauca-
sus and how its heterogeneity is to be explained, there are almost no theories 
about the linguistic and ethnic patterns30 in other parts of the world.
It is widely known and yet still unexplained, why africa features a wide 
northern zone with only Afro-Asian (formerly ‘Hamito-Semitic’) languages, 
a South characterised by the rather recent expansion of Bantu languages with 
little differentiation, and in the middle lies the so-called fragmentation belt 
between the atlantic and south-west ethiopia, which contains not only three 
language families31 but also many of their furthest differentiated branches in 
29   slogans purporting the position (e. g. in ethiopia, Kazakstan, or Indonesia) are 
unity in diversity etc.
30   This concerns large scale patterns of wider contexts and areas. Theories on the origin  
and movements of individual ethnic groups exist in abundance.
31   niger-kordofanian (i. e. niger-congo plus kordofanian), nilo-saharan and afro-
asian.
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a tightly knit mosaic. I know of no attempts to systematically explain, which 
factors further large, homogenous expansions and which foster the formation 
of a small-scale mosaic. also known to all social anthropologists working on 
africa is that a particular ecological-economic niche, namely nomad cattle 
herding, provides for many ethnic groups with many different languages in 
east africa, while in west africa mobile cattle breeders are all Fule. Yet, the 
why remains unanswered.
Youssouf Diallo brings first light to this theoretical darkness of linguistic-
ethnic expansion patterns with his thesis. He does not aim to solve the above-
mentioned problem on the continental scale, but he does provide vital insights 
into the interaction of Fule and numerous non-Fule groups in west african 
countries32 and thus delivers an important building block for further studies.
the subtitle with only two countries mentioned is almost an understate-
ment, as Diallo’s findings go far beyond Burkina Faso or the ivory coast. 
he provides a wide overview of the Fule ethnogenesis, Fule movements, 
and forms of interaction with other ethnic groups that not only shed light on 
diachronic and transcontinental relations but also on comparisons of forms 
of interaction at different times and in different places.
we learn that the initial differentiation of the proto-serer into serer, wolof, 
and Fule involved military, political, religious, and economic aspects. in 
some cases, today’s ethnonyms are derived from the names of former states 
(e. g. jolof > wolof), which hints at a parallelisation or congruence of eth-
nicity and state very much like the idea of the modern nation state. in other 
phases or places, the stabilisation of ethnic borders within a polity seems to 
depend primarily on economic differentiation (including military, adminis-
trative, religious, or ritual niches of income).
the differentiation between Bobo and Bwa, on the one hand, and Fule, on 
the other, corresponds basically to that of farmers and cattle breeders. in other 
cases it requires more attention to detail to distinguish the mere language us-
age from forms of group affiliation and their further-reaching implications. If a 
herder begins to trade in the northern ivory coast, this action is called dyulaya, 
after the dyula, ethnic group of the prototypical traders. however, if and to 
what extent a trading Pullo then becomes a dyula or can count on the solidar-
ity of other dyula is an entirely different question. the same caution applies 
to the term Bambara (Bamana)/Fule. ‘Fula’, the Bamana term for Fule, may 
be used for Fule who are also recognised by others as such, or be used as a 
mere occupation title referring to anyone who herds cattle for himself or others.
the economic differentiation between mossi and Fule was no present in 
the very beginning. the Fule did have a special religious role, were more 
strongly oriented towards cattle husbandry, and lived as a local minority un 
32   the focus is on Burkina Faso and the ivory coast, but one stretch of the route between 
the two countries leads across mali.
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peu partout between the mossi villages, but the instrumentalisation of that 
difference and the further differentiation only developed after the increase of 
cattle ownership among the mossi, which had the effect that wealthy mossi 
no longer tended their cattle themselves but rather had the Fule tend to it.
diallo points out that this case of congruence of ethnic group and profes-
sion can either be the result of the monopolisation of an economic niche by 
a single ethnic group or of the ethnisation of a professional group. of course, 
both processes may also occur at the same time working towards the same 
end from different sides.
although the overall map of the west african fragmentation belt shows pre-
dominantly differences that survived or developed, there are rare cases of as-
similation. As a paradox, in situations with no written records, assimilation can 
only be detected if it is incomplete. there must be surviving signs of a former 
identity. the cultural whole of all learned practices and knowledge including 
the oral history must allude to a mixture or synthesis of formerly separate lines 
of tradition. Such older affiliations that are recalled next to currently fore-
grounded identifications establish interethnic bridges or cross-cutting ties. The 
old clan names, called patronyms by Fule scholars although they are exactly 
not that, can be found in many different sub-ethnicities of the Fule and other 
ethnic groups beyond them. are persons by that clan name Fule, who have 
been partly assimilated by other ethnic groups but preserved their origin tradi-
tions? diallo also found a reverse case, in which fuleised senufo from san 
(mali) had adopted patronyms and cattle brand marks from Fule.
it is a reasonable and well-documented causality that maintained or newly 
formed or emphasised differences often also entail an economic differen-
tiation and avoidance of competition.33 The next interpretation step is more 
functionalistic: ethnic differences are attributed with the function of differ-
entiating peacefully and avoiding competition in multi-ethnic systems. Yet, 
Diallo shows that complementary exchange relations and violent conflicts 
do not exclude one another. He names the Mossi as example and the Fule 
living in between the mossi power centres. Fule occasionally raid the mossi 
and sometimes they even conduct raids together with mossi against other 
mossi. the theorem ‘integration durch Verschiedenheit (integration through 
difference)’34 thus requires reassessment and possibly limits to its validity. it 
should also be more strongly considered that next to war and peace there is 
a myriad mixed forms of interethnic relations and also more or less comfort-
able forms of mere co-existence (see Schlee 2003: 57ff.).35 
the power centres and the spaces in between bring us to the spatial circum-
stances and spatial imaginations that are also part of the thesis and find their 
33   see e.g. haaland 1969, whom diallo also refers to.
34   so the title of horstmann/schlee 2001.
35   see also mutie 2003.
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representation already in the title espaces interstitiels. Pre-colonial african 
kingdoms and the chiefdoms of the mossi do not define themselves through 
their borders (finis) but by their power centres, whose influence decreases 
gradually with outward distance.36 In these spaces with lesser state influence, 
the Fule remained semi-independent, formed changing alliances, or simply 
withdrew out of state reach.
Diallo examines forms of mobility and of spatial organisation, the relations 
of Fule with other ethnic groups and the state, and how the state influences 
interethnic relations over time and space up to the recent conflict situations 
and the problems that arise from modern-day development policy interven-
tions.
michaela Pelican’s dissertation thesis Getting along in the Grassfields: 
interethnic relations and identity politics in northwest Cameroon also in-
cludes a Fule component.37 The result of 14 months of fieldwork, the study 
is based on extended case studies from the years 2000 to 2002 including data 
collected via new methods, e. g. role play in theatre groups. this technique 
particularly highlights interethnic relations and those between stereotypical 
social characters, sometimes in a rather comic form.
the ethnic landscape of northern cameroon can be divided into three com-
munities. the biggest is comprised of grassland farmers, who live in small, 
local ‘kingdoms’ and speak niger-congo languages of those varieties for-
merly known as the ‘semi-Bantu’ languages. the second largest community 
are the Fule-mbororo (particularly jafun and aku), who combine cattle hus-
bandry and farming. linguistically, they are close to grassland groups,38 but 
they do not use this closeness to build alliances, much like the third commu-
nity. the third and smallest community comprises village dwellers of differ-
ent ethnic origins, who are subsumed under the category ‘hausa’ and often 
invoke their muslim faith in order to ally with the Fule-mbororo and at the 
same time distance themselves from the grassland groups.
In one of the extended case studies, Pelican presents the conflict surround-
ing the investiture of the present king of Misaje, the main research field site 
in northern cameroon. muslims protested out of religious reasons against 
that which was required for the coronation of the new king. Pelican explains 
that a heated political climate on the national level also influenced the situ-
ation. group rights had moved closer to the centre of attention and were 
advocated more vigorously as had been the case before. For this ‘religious’ 
conflict, past avoidances (such as mutually ignoring characteristics that con-
36   they share this characteristic with e.g. the javanese kingdoms (schiel 1989). see 
also evers 1997, who brought the idea of unlimited and limited spaces into the 
modern urban context.
37   doctorate (2006) at the martin luther university halle-wittenberg.
38   as mentioned before, Fulfulde also belongs to the niger-congo language family.
Photo 5: misaje, north west cameroon 
Fulɓe-mbororo together with the hausa celebrate the end of ramadan.
 (M. Pelican, 2005)
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tradict one’s own norms) were abandoned. Both sides sought the confronta-
tion, the test of power. even worse, there were no rules in place (yet), how to 
deal with religious sensibilities for a coronation ritual. regulated pluralism, 
as opposed to unregulated plurality, had not yet developed.
In this context, Pelican utilises the theorem ‘integration through difference’ 
(horstmann/schlee 2001). She presents an entire range of examples that con-
firm the theory ex negativo. the reduction of differences led to worse con-
flict situations. Ethnic and sub-ethnic groups left their economic niches over 
the course of income diversification and consequently entered into competi-
tion with one another.39 the formerly clear religious lines were also blurred. 
some grassland dwellers converted to islam, and muslims of other ethnici-
ties (e. g. hausa and Fule-mbororo) were accused of ritual crimes that only 
non-muslims had been thought capable of (see also below). Furthermore, 
emphasising religious similarities as ‘Muslims’ at the expense of emphasis-
ing the ethnic differences between hausa and Fule-mbororo did not prove 
conflict mitigating.
The lessening of differences leads to new conflict potential, although this 
is not the only effect. Under certain circumstances, conflict mitigating fac-
tors can also be strengthened by reduced differences. connubium and re-
affiliation cause cross-cutting ties, which are, according to Pelican, only an 
integrative force in times of peace and in the personal sphere. “in the face of 
39   See also Dafinger/Pelican 2006.
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political or economic rivalry […] individuals with cross-cutting allegiances 
are required to take sides and become favoured targets of criticism […]. [C]
ross-cutting ties, [though], facilitate the groups’ reintegration after the con-
flict has passed” (2006: 435). This confirms earlier findings that cross-cutting 
ties have by themselves neither integrative nor divisive effect, but that the 
nature of the effect depends on the political rhetoric they are used for (see 
schlee 1997b, 2004b).
the relation between ‘integration through difference’ and legal pluralism 
appears slightly more complicated. Does the coexistence of different legal 
forms further integration or act as a disruptive and divisive factor? Pelican 
gives an example of an individual who was all too successful in forum shop-
ping in a plural legal system and was thus driven into social isolation. in 
cameroon, the legal system shows particular plurality, as there are several 
corrupted variations to each form of law. Pelican states: “considering cam-
eroon’s plural legal framework and its corrupted variations, the question 
emerges of the degree to which procedural strategies, such as political lob-
bying and litigation, promote the opponents’ reconciliation and social inte-
gration” (2006: 423). Next to the different forms of law exist no less forms 
of habitualised injustice – whoever plays best on this keyboard and wins the 
legal battle is by no means the just victor in the eyes of the community.
one decisive factor, whether a particular plural legal system has an inte-
grative effect or not, is the existence of a meta-level, where the different legal 
forms are put in relation with one another. we can assume that clear relational 
rules might prevent the negative effects of legal pluralism as described by 
Pelican. ultimately, both (or all) parties to a legal battle must accept the 
same law and the verdict of one specific forum. As this does not always occur 
voluntarily, there must be rules which law applies to which persons, on prin-
ciple or on request, and how disputes between persons of different origin can 
be resolved. naturally, there are different jurisdictions concerning different 
fields of law and classes of crimes and offences. However, as Pelican notes, 
situations in which one party with greater endurance simply continues forum 
shopping until it wins somewhere are unsatisfying and cause more conflicts. 
along such differentiations, we should distinguish between such plural legal 
systems, in which the differences hinder integration, those in which they do 
not effect integration, and those in which legal pluralism might even further 
the peaceful integration of a society, perhaps because law is in general better 
accepted (especially where the alternative is lawlessness) or after the motto 
‘to each his own’.
another focus of the study lies on magic-religious beliefs and practices. 
over the last two decades, discourses on so-called ‘occult economies’ that 
allegedly use magic means to material ends (comaroff/comaroff 1999: 297) 
have gained significance in the research region. In her analysis of said devel-
opment, Pelican rightly points to works on witchcraft and social inequality, 
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the most significant of which concern cameroon.40 she further documents 
that muslim groups are increasingly suspected of taking part in ‘occult econ-
omies’. Her findings also suggest that members of the grassland groups no 
longer accept differences constructed along ethnic-religious lines to the ex-
tent to which they were accepted in the past. that muslims never used certain 
kinds of magic before is an assumption, which is empirically as sustainable 
or unsustainable as the belief behind these phenomena. however, the belief 
in such distinctions can prevent certain suspicions and thus act conflict miti-
gating. Are such distinctions lessened, new conflicts may arise.
after the account about the Fule in different parts of africa, we will now 
turn to the Uzbeks. Similar to the Fule, Uzbekness has many facets both 
inside and outside of Uzbekistan. As Peter Finke’s habilitation thesis (2005) 
shows, the comparison of different groups inside Uzbekistan already yields 
rich comparative studies. his thesis, Variations on Uzbek identities: concepts, 
constraints and local configurations, is a comparative study based on field-
work in four regions of Uzbekistan. The field sites are spread across almost 
the entire West-East expanse of the country. They comprise the Khorezm, 
Bukhara, and Shahrisabz oases and the Ferghana valley.
the comparison of these research regions yields a typology of interethnic 
contact situations that will shed light on central research questions of our 
Department at the Max Planck Institute. One theory on social identifications 
in multi-ethnic scenarios that is being developed in the department aims to 
answer questions such as: Which taxonomies are social identities placed in? 
Are there recurring patterns or schemes of identity changes? To what extent 
is social identification based on conscious decisions? Which considerations 
enter into such decisions?
Elwert (1989) calls the simultaneous existence of two different taxono-
mies for the placement of the same group in social space ‘polytaxis’. Within 
polytactic identification spaces, a group can place itself in a linguistic-ethnic 
and a religious taxonomy. Thus the population of a village might consider 
itself Uzbek as a sub-category of Turkic peoples and Sunni as a sub-category 
of Muslims. The change from one taxonomic frame of reference to another 
is one of the meanings that elwert ascribes the term ‘switching’ (elwert 
2002).41 depending on the changing awarding of legitimacy according to the 
discourse type (Dench 1986; Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 
2001: 57 und 2003: 94), the identity discourse of one and the same group may 
at one time highlight religion, class, ethnicity, language, descent, region, or 
anything else. For such contexts, I use the term dimensions of identification 
and their change, e. g. when the discourse strategy turns from the religious 
40   see also geschiere 1997.
41   the identity change of an individual, situational or in the sense of ‘(ethnic) conversion’, 
is ‘switching’ of a different kind.
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dimension (with elements such as Sunni or Shiite, or on a higher taxonomic 
plane muslim or christian) to the linguistic-ethnic dimension (Uzbeks, ka-
zaks, etc.). The picture behind it is a three-dimensional42 coordinate system 
with an x-, y-, and z-axis, which allows for the allocation of a value for each 
of the three dimensions to every point in space. much as for points in a coor-
dinate system, for which any one of three questions may take the foreground, 
namely 1) how far up/down; 2) how far to the side; and 3) how deep in space 
lies the point, in the case of social identification one or another dimension 
may be addressed. 43
the advancement of knowledge consists of including the always supposed, 
the half-heartedly known, and the colloquially hinted-at rather than explicitly 
addressed into such models and schemes that might provide greater clarity. 
Another advancement of knowledge lies in the mixture of these models, in 
order to show that they cannot do justice to the complexity of the described 
topic.
in light of the mentioned models, some of Finke’s findings are heterodox. 
central asians seem to lack the logic consistency, which these models pre-
suppose. and since it is unlikely that central asians are particular in this 
respect, it begs the question to what extent people are prisoner to their logic 
at all or are able to set aside this logic on a case-to-case basis.
the models mentioned above assume that categorical inclusion also fur-
thers group membership, even if it was membership in a rather vague large 
group. thus, invoking islam implies membership in the worldwide commu-
nity of all muslims, the umma, as well as admitting the belonging to the 
umma in front of all others who claim islamic faith. according to Finke’s 
findings, Islam is considered as a unifying and common central asian iden-
tity-establishing factor, but that does still not entail the inclusion of chechens 
or meskhetian turks into the we group. it is thus a criterion used – in this 
case islam – that would include others in the collective identity, who are 
meant to be excluded and are in fact treated as non-members in practice. 
This fact is ignored, however. Verbal statements (and possibly also explicit, 
conscious knowledge) show dissonance to the practical behaviour (implicit 
knowledge?).
42   as a picture, a three-dimensional system is far more easily comprehensible with 
visual imagination. in an abstract model, there are of course limitless numbers of 
dimensions.
43   In explaining switches between dimensions of identification, I propose to focus 
particularly on the resulting group size and the inclusion of ones labelled the same/ 
exclusion of ones labelled the other. Do the proponents of a certain identity discourse  
aim to belong to a larger group or an alliance of likeminded groups (inclusion strategy) 
or to remain secluded (exclusion strategy)? Does the switch of dimension result  
in a narrower or wider reference frame (small language group/ big religion or vice 
versa)? Of course group size must be considered on the basis of qualitative aspects 
(power, wealth, status, etc.). see schlee 2000, 2004b, 2006.
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Much as the religious classification is not clean-cut, language families and 
degrees of affiliation and acceptance also overlap. As muslims, the meskhe-
tian Turks fulfil one criterion of inclusion in central asia, albeit to no avail in 
practice, linguistically they also feel at home there and yet are still not wel-
comed by the other central asian ethnicities. the latter follow the academic 
classification of the language families. As speakers of a turkic language, 
they consider themselves close to Uzbeks and Kazaks, who feel more prox-
imity to the tajiks, speakers of an iranian language, who are – other than the 
meskhetian turks – considered true central asians (see Finke 2005: 295).
in three of four research areas, Finke found an ethnic hierarchy with two 
lead groups belonging to different language families. in upper-Qashqadarya 
(Shahrisabz), the Bukhara oasis, and the Ferghana valley, both Uzbeks and 
tajiks (both in the sense of language communities) are seen as the central 
representatives of the local identity and enjoy a very high status. Bicepha-
lous ethnic hierarchies might be called the ‘austria-hungary-model’, they 
are much rarer than ethnic hierarchies with only one peak.
upper-Qashqadarya is of particular interest in this context. Here, different 
ethnicities are grouped around a ‘core’, which is comprised of Uzbeks of a cer-
tain dialect group and – with only slightly lower status – tajiks. if one wants 
to claim high status, one must speak one very particular variation of Uzbek, 
or no Uzbek at all but rather tajik. the two variations are only distinguished 
by one certain phoneme, which takes on the pronunciation /zh/ in one and 
/y/ in the other. speakers of the Qipchaq dialect (‘the zh people’) have closer 
ties to a nomadic tradition and display remnants of a clan organisation that is 
reminiscent of the turk-mongolian military organisation during the middle 
Ages. The speakers of the Qarluq dialect (‘the y people’) are the indigenous 
oasis farmers, like the tajiks sedentary and according to their self-image part 
of the tajik culture, i. e. descendants of a superior, empire-building, urban, and 
scholarly central asian, islamic civilisation. where Uzbeks and tajiks are at 
the centre of local autochthonism and legitimacy, these groups are also es-
pecially interesting due to how they combine characteristics in their identity 
discourses. the most common operator for the combination of characteristics 
in identity discourses is and. to be a true Pole, one must speak Polish and be 
a catholic. to be a mainstream american (wasP), one has to be ‘white’ and 
an Anglo-Saxon and a Protestant, to name but a few examples. Real authentic-
ity is often created or claimed through the additive accumulation of affiliation 
characteristics. in the present case, however, the operator is or. one must either 
speak a specific dialect or its (linguistically speaking) radical alternative, tajik. 
Bukhara is special among the three regions. while the Ferghana valley and 
Qachqadarya maintained the ethnic differentiation between (‘y-’) Uzbeks and 
tajiks, albeit with (almost complete) equality, Bukhara features one, largely bi-
lingual population with high status, which resulted from a long history of inter-
marriage between Uzbek and tajik speakers and frequent language switches. 
Photo 6: a farmer at the 
oasis of Bukhara 
(G. Schlee, 2004)
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thus, the lead group in this local hierarchy is one ethnicity with two languages. 
this could only be called a dual lead from the perspective of the languages 
and their prestige, speaker communities, however, cannot be distinguished or 
ethnicised due to the high rate of bilingualism.
Meltem Sancak‘s (2012) research also provides findings on factors that 
further the local integration in Bukhara and strip the language divide of any 
divisive effects. the elaborate marriage and circumcision celebrations are 
only possible with the active support of all neighbours. local endogamy pre-
vails: students studying away from home will meet their future spouses from 
their own or a neighbouring village, as students form regional groups in order 
to cook together and for joint journeys home.
Following this typology of ethnic hierarchies, we will now focus in the 
relation between diachrony and synchrony. i will not be able to summarise 
the history of central asia any better than Finke did. one empire of nomadic 
origin, that is the mongolian empire and the kingdoms of the diadochi that 
sprang from it, and many kingdoms with urban centres in an irrigation oasis 
alternated with one another and had complex interactions with tribal pasto-
ralists or warring herders. the latter conquered the kingdoms, or worked for 
them as mercenaries. sometimes, they were even transformed into peaceful 
48 A Comparative and Theoretical Framework
farmers. large parts of the sedentary population speak iranian languages, 
early forms of today’s tajik or languages of other branches of iranian. the 
share of iranian speakers was bigger in the past. there were many turki-
sation processes on both ends of the spectrum between oasis dwellers and 
herder warriors. The Mongolian rule brought the first Turkic influences as its 
agents were speakers of turkic languages. iranian farmers and city dwellers 
also adopted Turkic languages, and thus the modern Uzbek and Khorezmian 
came to be, both turk languages with iranian substrate, and in the case of 
standard Uzbek lacking vowel harmony.
many of these processes are evident today in the spectrum of turkophony. 
turkic peoples preserved remnants of the mongolian military organisation 
in their clan names and extensive patrilineal genealogies, such as locally un-
bound herders use to differentiate other and self, close and distant, or friend 
and enemy. turk peoples also continue the heritage of iranian farmers. this 
complex history lives on in the plurality of languages, dialects, forms of so-
cial organisation and modes of living within the sphere of turk languages.
history is written chronologically towards the present. since we, as ob-
servers, look at history from the present, it is a reverse perspective. Viewed 
from the present, Finke’s historic results mean that the people of central asia 
carry their history around with them, it sticks to them. As the example of 
Shahrisabz showed, the pronunciation of /zh/ as /y/ indicates nomadic herit-
age, a shorter sedentary tradition, less legitimacy as members of the local 
group, a lesser degree of ‘civilisation’, etc. …
lastly, i want to draw the line from the history to the decision theory as laid 
out in Finke’s thesis. history itself can be seen as a succession of decisions 
made by more or less important actors with intended or unintended conse-
quences. the sources do not always reveal the actors’ calculations behind 
their decisions. still, Finke very convincingly interprets a number of historic 
developments with decision theory. it made sense for the iranian oasis farm-
ers and traders to linguistically adapt to their nomadic surroundings. such 
processes occurred time and again, and some of them lead to emergence of 
today’s standard Uzbek and Khorezm.
Ordinarily, decision theorists will examine present actors and their choices 
between different options, as this provides them with opportunity to observe 
and possibly enquire after the reasons and motives.
Decision theory requires the examination of decision possibilities (options) 
and the modelling of the decision between these options. of particular relevance 
are the cost-benefit-calculations, that is perceived cost-benefit components that 
represent new knowledge, which must first be acquired. Finke thus examines 
the concepts of similarity and difference for each local individual case. in order 
to conceptually introduce similarities and differences, ethnonyms are presented 
with the range of their meanings, which can differ from region to region. i refer 
to the example of Uzbeks and tajiks, who can be seen as two ethnic groups or as 
Photo 7: a group of girls in front of the mausoleum of ahmad Yaswi at turkistan, south 
Kazakstan. They only wear headscarfs for the visiting of the islamic sanctum. The one 
with the colors of the american banner serves the purpose just as well as all the others.  
 (G. Schlee, 2004)
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one ethnic group with two languages. Next is the attribution of cultural charac-
teristics and their evaluation (piety and hospitality are said to be Uzbek qualities, 
the Kyrgyz are said to be bad cooks …). Some examples may state ambiva-
lences (in present-day secular-autocratic Uzbekistan an all too pious muslim is 
quickly suspected of being a bad citizen) or even sheer stereotypes, but they can 
hardly be excluded from the analysis as they also shape positive and negative 
attitudes towards and views of cultural proximity or distance and thus open up 
or block off paths to assimilation. Proximity or distance find their expression in 
the formation of clusters. in Khorezm, for example, the Uzbeks, Kazaks, and 
karakalpaks feel closer to one another than to the turkmen. the world outside 
Central Asia, if it is noted at all, also exists in clusters of similarities in the per-
ception of the study subjects. as mentioned before, these perceived clusters can 
contradict the categories of proper classification systems. Although language 
and religion play a role in the discourse of similarities, tatars and (meskhetian, 
Anatolian, etc.) Turks are not included in the circle of proximity despite the pan-
turkic logic, in contrast the tajiks are included. and despite considering religion 
and being Muslim a factor of cultural proximity, muslims from outside central 
asia are not perceived as close.
For modelling the structure of the social space, cognitive anthropology and 
its methods (sorting cards on a table and recording the accompanying expla-
nations …) yields findings that differ distinctly from those presented above, 
ones based on categorisation systems (taxonomies, polytaxis, etc.).
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Processes of changing ethnic identities are here often forms of assimi-
lation. self-determined isolation or dissimilation (e. g. to cope adequately 
with the trader’s dilemma44) seem to play no role. there is a strong tendency 
to become Uzbek, which can be done at relatively low cost (e. g. there is no 
necessity for a long genealogy and its convincing representation, as would 
be the case for a Kazak) and yields benefits such as newly opened commu-
nication spaces and education and advancement opportunities.
Finke’s five local studies examine sub-ethnicities of Uzbeks in their re-
spective settlement areas. in a complementary work, rano turaeva (2010)45 
studies migrants, who moved from one part of Uzbekistan to another. As for 
the Fule migrants in new contexts from above, who were examined as a 
Barth test case of how ethnicity is articulated at the border to other ethnicities, 
this study examines sub-ethnicities of Uzbeks in new contact situations and 
how they articulate new forms and relate to them.
Khorezm lies in western Uzbekistan and claims the proud heritage of a me-
dieval empire, although it has a marginal position today and suffers ecological 
problems that also lead to health problems among the population.46 among 
other destinations, Khorezm migrants reach tashkent, the capital of Uzbeki-
stan, where they form tight networks. due to the restrictive practices of issuing 
residence permits in tashkent, many of these migrants live as illegals in their 
own country. men organise into squads of construction workers and also take 
contracts in the south of Kazakstan, where Uzbeks make up a significant part 
of the population (darieva 2003). all this requires discretion and solidarity.
While the men usually seek employment together with other Khorezmi-
ans in this mixed ethnic surrounding, some women entrepreneurs find a pure 
niche existence within the Khorezmian enclave, but others are quite open and 
worldly. one such Big Woman organises construction worker squads, buys 
and renovates houses, finds accommodation for Khorezmian migrants, and ar-
ranges marriages among the Khorezmians in Tashkent. She has the Khorezmi-
an workers ‘under her arm’, because the degree of entanglement of the sub-
ethnic communities and their seclusiveness block off other alternatives for the 
workers outside the community. the possible seclusiveness of the other sub-
ethnic communities further consolidates the situation. the wives of these men 
are ‘friends’ and ‘helpers’ of the Big Woman, i. e. they manage her household 
44   evers/schrader 1994.
45   Turaeva’s dissertation project is co-financed by the Max Planck Institute for 
Psycholinguistics in nijmegen and also supervised by wolfgang klein.
46   these problems are caused by salinisation and pesticide residues, both the result 
of intensive cotton cultivation on irrigation land. this situation also plays a role 
in kehl-Bodrogi’s research (department ‘socialist and postsocialist eurasia’) on 
pilgrimage sites. these owe their stream of visitors partly to such health problems 
(in particular women’s fertility issues) and the lack of affordable medical care 
(see kehl-Bodrogi/schlee, 2007).
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and garden without regular employment. one might regard this as an ethnic 
trap47. the security and protection of the sub-ethnic community are bought at 
the expense of freedom and advancement opportunities. Breaking free from 
this dependency might entail the small chance for a better income elsewhere, 
but it also bears the risk of complete impoverishment.
those blocked off opportunities bring us to the problem of agency. in order to 
examine variation and co-variation we have to move beyond sterile dichotomies 
(freedom of choice/constraint, freedom/captivity) and also consider agency as 
a variable with many grades. actors operate within tighter or wider spaces of 
agency or they work towards widening their own agency or curtailing that of 
others. For the example of the Big Woman it is clear that she has many more 
options than the people ‘under her arm’. and yet, her options are also limited. 
Even if she was no ardent Khorezmian regionalist and did not play the ethnic 
card (which she de facto does all too gladly), she would still be forced to do so. 
all other sub-ethnicities in tashkent act the same way, most of all the native 
tashkent population themselves, who look down on anyone not speaking the city 
dialect. the Big Woman protects her people from the authorities, finds accom-
modation for them in the Khorezmian neighbourhood, arranges endogamous 
marriages within the Khorezmian community in tashkent to keep that commu-
nity pure and to make it grow – all actions by which she proves that she has far 
more agency than e. g. her gardener, who is at the mercy of her whims.
a mosaic of ethnic niches represents a structure from which an individual, if 
so desired (as not all people are equally individualist as others), can only free 
herself with difficulty. Someone wanting to leave the seclusion of his or her own 
group, will be rebuffed and sent back to his or her own by the seclusion practiced 
by other groups. at times, ethnic and sub-ethnic borders will also be reinforced 
by the international discourse on group rights or by the national administrative 
divisions. as far as such an ethnic and sub-ethnic group mosaic leaves space for 
agency, decisions can be modelled by stating the advantages and disadvantages 
of the available options. in west africa, Fule cattle herders are often allotted ar-
eas for their cattle production, they receive support in marketing their cattle, and 
they are protected from raids by other groups. this is not the case everywhere. 
But in such areas, the support concerns one niche existence within a particular 
branch of food production: extensive cattle grazing. This same niche existence 
hampers their access to education and participation in mainstream society. the 
same can be said for many such niches, whether it be Fule lorry drivers in the 
47   This is only one kind of ethnic trap. They exist in manifold forms in numerous places.  
ethnic organisations, institutions protecting minorities, and niche economies 
present advancement opportunities, but they do not lead as far as opportunities in  
the mainstream societies do. while climbing the career ladder up the ethnic rungs,  
the aspirant may not realise that he chose a relatively short ladder. even states may 
fall into ethnic traps by granting ethnic groups territorial rights in certain regions 
in the hopes of preserving a peaceful whole on the national level. however, this 
may also cause dynamics of violent disentanglement and ‘ethnic cleansing’.
52 A Comparative and Theoretical Framework
sudan (abu-manga, 2009) or Khorezm construction workers in tashkent. Better 
internal integration is often achieved at the expense of external relations and the 
exclusion by others. In order for the relation between internal integration and 
external relations not to be a zero-sum situation, an actor must be able to play 
the keyboard of social relations very well. no doubt, there are persons, such as 
ethnic entrepreneurs or brokers of voting-packages in the parliamentary system, 
who can utilise their internal integration to strengthen their position to the out-
side. Then, both types of relations are added together and not, as in the zero-sum 
situation, subtracted from one another.
another comparison reveals differences between Fule and Uzbeks but 
parallels with other parts of central asia. as sancak and Finke have shown, 
Uzbek identity is significantly shaped by local references. The Fule, in con-
trast, have a segmentary system of lineages and clans that follows patrilin-
eal descent models. locality also plays a role in this system and it remains 
sometimes unclear, whether a group was named after a locale or a locale after 
a group, and if long co-residence and intermarriage might not also be reinter-
preted as common patrilineal descent. despite the mutual penetration of both 
forms of identification, genealogy does take the foreground for the Fule.
in this respect, they are more similar to the Kazaks and not the Uzbeks. ka-
zaks have a genealogical tree (shajara, derived from the arabic word for tree), 
which encompasses the entire ethnic group and has since long been undergo-
ing textualisation and standardisation processes. Next to the Kazak language, 
it is this genealogical tree, which defines the Kazaks as such. Functionality 
does not enter into consideration. educated, urban Kazaks, who speak Russian 
among themselves, often give the impression that they drew their identity from 
a language they do not speak and a genealogy they do not know. The existence 
of these two reference systems, however, is of great symbolic importance.
Kazaks and Fule thus confirm the general finding that portable reference sys-
tems (genealogical knowledge that may be stored in memory or a simple notebook) 
are of great importance among nomadic or not yet long sedentary populations48, 
while Uzbeks, in this regard only superficially Turkicised oasis farmers, preserved 
a strongly classificatory and emotional identification with their respective locales.
the marriage distance usually quite small among both the Fule and the Uzbeks, 
both follow a basic endogamous attitude. in the case of the Fule, the distance is 
a genealogical one49, in case of the Uzbeks it is rather geographic. Someone who 
gives his daughter to a man living several kilometres away sends her abroad.
48   see the section ‘social structures associated with pastoralism’ in schlee 2005a: 34 ff.
49   For the woaae (Niger), Schareika (2007) notes the coexistence of endogamous 
marriages and marriage by abduction, while the latter is also accepted as a legitimate  
form of marriage. The robbed group may fight back, but outside Woaae and the 
state may not interfere. The less distant connubium (arranged marriage) defines 
the small patrilineal group, whereas the more distant one (marriage by abduction 
from rival lineages) characterises the larger community of all woaae.
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(aida aaly alyMbaeva)
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Aida Aaly Alymbaeva studied Russian language and literature in Bishkek 
Humanities University, Kyrgyzstan. She was a senior researcher at the Aigi-
ne Cultural Research Center, Kyrgyzstan. Working for said organisation 
from 2005 to 2010, she was involved in studies of Kyrgyz traditional knowl-
edge, particularly the phenomena of sacred sites. Her research experience 
includes the study of identity issues of Kyrgyz inner migrants, done in Kel-
echek peri-urban area of Bishkek from 2003 to 2007. Between 2004 and 
2006, Aida Aaly Alymbaeva taught at the Anthropology Department of the 
American University of Central Asia. Her courses focused on Ethnic Identity 
and Ethnographic Studies of Central Asia. Currently, she is a PhD candidate 
at the Max Plank Institute for Social Anthropology, Germany. Her project 
focuses on the identity politics in Kyrgyzstan. 
My dissertation examines the processes of identification in Kyrgyzstan in the 
case of the village chelpek. this village is known as kalmak or sart-kalmak 
to most of Kyrgyzstan, at least, to its Kyrgyz-speaking population. Almost 
everyone who is connected to this village is called a kalmak or sart-kalmak 
and ascribed with a number of characteristics. many of the chelpek inhabitants 
are themselves aware of and believe in these ascribed characteristics. chelpek 
villagers would say they are kalmaks, or sart-kalmaks, or Kyrgyz – depending 
on the situation. due to age and gender, chelpek’s people feel differently 
about these ascriptions – proud, hesitant, annoyed, or disinterested. the majority 
of publications, both academic and popular media, mention this village as 
kalmak/sart-kalmak. censuses contain the title ‘kalmyks’ in the list of 
nations/ethnic groups. However, the village itself officially represents itself 
as Kyrgyz at the local level events. In my dissertation, I ask what constitutes 
the ethnic concepts ‘kalmak’ and ‘sart-kalmak’ in contemporary kyr-
gyzstan. And what role do they play under which circumstances as well as 
how they influence the current national politics of Kyrgyzstan? Through un-
derstanding the shifting boundaries of these ethnic concepts in one particular 
settlement i aim to analyse the dynamics of ethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan 
within the minority and state paradigm. 
map 1: topographic map of chelpek
64 Current Projects
In this short essay, I describe the field setting – the chelpek village, its nature 
and all that is important for the scope of my study.
rural meets urBan: karakol’s inFluence on chelPek
chelpek is an administrative unit consisting of three villages: tash-kyia to 
the east, chelpek in the centre and Burma-suu to the west.1 it was established 
around the turn of the 20th century when sart-kalmaks (or kalmaks; the two 
terms are used interchangeably with regard to the inhabitants of chelpek) 
migrated from the territory of Xinjiang in China. According to figures pro-
vided by the local council Aiyl Ökmöt, chelpek’s present-day population is 
approximately eight thousand. 
chelpek is located near the town of karakol (formerly Przheval’sk), an 
administrative centre of the Yssyk-kol Province, along the east shore of 
lake Yssyk-kol in Kyrgyzstan. The territory of each of the three villages has 
grown extensively since the second half of the 20th century, so that today an 
outsider can no longer see a contour between chelpek and karakol, the east-
1   ‘chelpek’ hereafter refers to the administrative unit comprising the three villages, 
not solely to the central village of chelpek.
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ern part of the former now merging with the latter. nor are there any signs 
posted that indicate a boundary between the two. nevertheless, chelpek con-
tinues to be separated administratively from karakol and belongs to the ak-
suu district. 
Chelpek’s proximity to karakol has been an advantage for some of its in-
habitants. For example, there are two secondary schools in chelpek itself, 
both situated in the western part of Burma-suu, but transportation within 
chelpek is limited. it is much more convenient, particularly for those in 
tash-kyia to the east, to attend the closer schools in karakol. chelpek’s in-
tellectuals contend that the opportunity to study at schools in Przheval’sk 
during the pre-Soviet era benefitted those chelpek villagers. the short dis-
tance to town allowed their grandfathers to work for russians and tatars on 
various jobs, for example, at the brick factory or in the mills. This also al-
lowed them to learn the russian language and, furthermore, when the soviet 
government was established, to become leaders of the newly organised kolk-
hozes and sovkhozes. It also made them eligible for positions in the capital 
Frunze (now Bishkek). this last fact, according to my informants, was one of 
the causes of subsequent animosity displayed towards them by the Kyrgyz. 
Chelpek villagers also assert that the proximity to town and thus to the 
cuisine of the russians, tatars, and uighurs (groups who had lived in kara-
kol since its inception) enriched their own cuisine much earlier than it did the 
cuisine in other Kyrgyz villages. Currently, one of the main benefits of being 
close to town is the opportunity to open small businesses such as cafes and 
other shops, as well as to trade at the local bazaar, which is located centrally 
in this part of the province. thus, they also have greater access to hard cur-
rency than those who live farther away from town. This proficiency in trade 
is often commented upon by outsiders as a distinguishing feature of the chel-
pek villagers, i. e. the sart-kalmaks: “they are the ones who know trading”, 
many of them say, linking it to the word ‘sart’ in the name of the group.2 
Relative proximity to or distance from the urban area is a way in which villag-
ers distinguish themselves from one another. those farther from karakol con-
tend that the villagers of tash-kyia (as mentioned above, now directly adjacent 
to the town) are more urbanised: “they do not communicate with each other, 
they do not invite visitors into their houses, [and they] do not share their bread”.3 
those who are from Burma-suu, the village most remote from the town, are 
considered better able to maintain their ‘traditional’ way of life. “we even have 
slight differences in how we speak”, they say. it is easy to conclude that chelpek 
is a place caught ‘in-between’ – i. e. between the rural and the urban.
2   ‘sart’ is an ethnic and cultural concept with its own historical implications and is 
subject to different interpretations, including ‘settled population of central asia’, 
or ‘trading nomads’ as chelpek villagers understand the term.
3   the sharing of bread represents the traditional manner of honouring one’s guest; in 
Kyrgyz, nan ooz tiiuu (‘to taste bread’) means ‘hospitality’.
Photo 1: water (both river 
and channel): a key to 
spatial organization in 
chelpek and one of the 
storylines in chelpek 
memory narratives 
(a. a. alyMbaeva, 2011)
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chelPek’s ProsPeritY: adVantages and dePendencies
chelpek’s territory stretches for almost seven kilometres, comprising houses and 
cornfields nestled between the foot of the Teskey Ala-Too Mountains and the 
central highway that circles the lake. to the west, Chelpek’s cornfields border 
the village of Yrdyk (known as the dungan settlement), while Börü-Bash (also 
known as a sart-kalmak village) and cherik (a Kyrgyz village) are to the north. 
the karakol river passes along the eastern side of chelpek. a smaller 
river passes through chelpek territory in the west, and a water channel 
crosses the territory from east to west. however, these sources do not pro-
vide villagers with abundant access to water for their cornfields. They must 
queue up for water, and they irrigate their plots of land during the night, not 
only to minimise evaporation, but mainly because they seldom reach their 
turn in the queue before night time. Furthermore, the village does not have 
an extensive public system for delivering drinking water. There are only a 
few public water sources along certain streets, but they provide the same 
unpurified water as the channel or the rivers. People have grown accus-
tomed to these unfiltered sources, however, and usually drink the water 
without boiling. nonetheless, according to the chelpek narratives, being 
Photo 2: Fruit gardens: a symbol of the village and an important means of income
 (a. a. alyMbaeva, 2011)
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close to the water (i. e. the rivers) was one of the crucial, decisive points in 
choosing this territory for settlement. 
nearness to water is also a vital factor in the cultivation of fruit gardens 
(primarily apples, apricots, and currants). this is one of the main activities 
and means of income in chelpek. while many of the villages in the Yssyk-
kol Province cultivate fruit gardens, it is commonly said in and around kara-
kol that chelpek is distinguished by the quality of its gardens and its ver-
dancy. this is used by local people as an ethnic marker for chelpek villagers. 
thus, the livelihood of the chelpek villagers depends in large part upon 
favourable weather, and events such as the hailstorm of august 2012 that 
severely damaged the apricot and apple harvest inflict a heavy cost. Howev-
er, the status of Kyrgyzstan’s economic and political relations with neigh-
bouring countries, especially Kazakhstan, has also become a vital concern of 
the villagers. Selling potatoes to Kazakhstan has been an important source of 
income, and when Kazakhstan closed its borders to goods from Kyrgyzstan 
in the autumn of 2011 and the winter and spring of 2012, chelpek suffered. 
People blamed the export ban on the customs union, which includes russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and on unresolved issues between Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan.4 the income of many Kyrgyz, including chelpek villagers, took 
4   the customs union was established in 2010. Kyrgyzstan is contemplating joining 
the union.
Photo 3: a villager shows his “lost” income. (a. a. alyMbaeva, 2011)
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a significant hit, since the price per ton of harvested potatoes had fallen so 
low that it could not cover even half of expenses. People waited to sell in the 
hopes of higher prices in the spring, and when that failed to transpire, the 
potatoes rotted. For this reason, the autumn of 2012, usually a time of feasts 
and weddings, was very subdued in the village. 
despite the vagaries of weather and politics, chelpek is still considered as 
one of the richest settlements in the area. this reputation was developed dur-
ing the period of 1985 – 1990, when its inhabitants traded their fruits freely to 
Ust-Kamenogorsk (Öskemen in Kazak), Semipalatinsk (Semey in Kazak), 
Novosibirsk, and Barnaul (now cities in Kazakhstan and Russia).
 among the most obvious visual measurements of such richness are the 
settlement’s roads and houses. while the conditions of chelpek’s roads are 
appalling by urban standards, they are typical for country roads: clay based, 
dusty in the dry season and prone to muddiness on rainy days. however, 
there are almost no abandoned houses in the villages, in which, according to 
residents, active building began as early as the 1960s. the majority of the 
houses are so-called russian or Kyrgyz types. Included in the photos are two 
examples of houses, one belonging to a family of little means, the other to a 
family regarded as financially secure. 
a short essay is by its nature limited in what it can depict and discuss. i 
have chosen two elements of Chelpek life: first, the phenomenon of ‘in-be-
Photo 4: An example of a house of a family considered prosperous, although its con-
struction began twenty years ago and it remains unfinished (A. A. alymbaeva, 2011)
Photo 5: one of the oldest houses in chelpek (a. a. alyMbaeva, 2011)
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tweenness’, particularly in the east of chelpek, where rural, village ways are 
increasingly influenced by the proximity to the urban town of karakol; and 
second, the opportunities for and limitations to prosperity in chelpek, as dic-
tated by land, water, weather, and the impact of relations between Kyrgyzstan 
and its neighbours. each of these elements provides insight into the everyday 
life and activities of the villagers and their identification processes. And this 
in turn inspires and furthers my research.
Photo 1: traditional irrigation channels and a view of the Panj river valley.
  (M. M. biczyk, 2012)
71CASCA
the re-negotiation oF local 
identitY under gloBal 
 inFluences: the case oF 
 tajikistan’s Pamir communities
(MaŁGorzata Maria biczyk)
Profile
Małgorzata Maria Biczyk attended the University of Warsaw from 2002 – 2008 
and the OSCE Academy in Bishkek from 2008 – 2009. Her interests range from 
social anthropology to political science with regard to the cultures of Central Asia, 
the Caucasus, and Russia. Her field research comprises areas in Turkmenistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and, recently, Tajikistan, where she focuses on religious and political 
transformation processes as well as identity issues within Central Asia.
the primary goal of my anthropological study of mountain communities in 
tajikistan’s Pamir region is to investigate how social and economic transforma-
tions have been experienced by the local population. In particular, this research 
assesses how change impacted the culture and identity of the people over the 
course of successive influential modernisation projects: during Soviet times, the 
neoliberal development, and the nation-state era. the analyses are conducted 
with respect to the province’s autonomous status, historically within the soviet 
Union and currently within the independent nation-state. I am specifically con-
cerned with the Pamir ismailis, who adhere to the shia branch of islam.
Photo 2: the shepards visiting the holy place (‘oston’) at the summer pastures.
 (M. M. biczyk, 2011)
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the tajik Pamir is a promising region for study, and yet has been underex-
plored in anthropological literature. my research area also goes by the name 
Badakhshan, refering to a province of the republic of tajikistan, administra-
tively designated as the gorno-Badakhshan autonomous Province (in rus-
sian, gorno Badakhshansa avtonomna oblast, gBao; in tajik, Viloyati 
Mukhtori Kūhistoni Badakhshon,VMKB). This province is part of the wider 
historical region of Badakhshan, situated among the mountain ranges of 
Pamir and the hindu kush (western himalaya), between china, afghanistan, 
and tajikistan. as such, it has recently gained the attention of researchers as 
well as tourists, the latter being drawn to its dramatic and relatively pristine 
landscape. the gBao was created as an administrative unit in 1925, and as 
mentioned above, today constitutes an autonomous region of the republic of 
tajikistan. it is inhabited mostly by Pamiri shia groups, sunni tajiks, and 
Kyrgyz; the most widely spoken languages, next to the nominal Tajik, belong 
to the east iranian language group. Pamir ismailis represent only a small 
fraction of the tajik population, although their fellow shia believers can be 
found in more than twenty-five countries worldwide. 
the soaring mountain ranges of the Pamir, combined with seventy years of 
communism, have created persistent conditions of cultural and economic 
isolation in the region. only after the collapse of the soviet union did the 
local people gain international attention, beginning with the aga khan de-
velopment network (akdn). Prince aga khan iV – the founder of akdn 
and, at the same time, the spiritual leader of the Ismaili group – has influ-
enced many spheres of social and economic life in the gBao through his 
network of organisations.
Photo 3: rushoni women in afghan Badakhshan collecting wood.  (M. M. biczyk, 2011)
Photo 4: rushoni family at the summer pastures. (M. M. biczyk, 2011)
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My research is based on fifteen months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted 
in the gBao and afghan Badakhshan among the shogni-rushoni speaking 
population. During my fieldwork, I spent an entire ritual year in a village, where 
i could observe the everyday practices and struggles not only with the eco-
nomic transformations, but also with the exuberant nature of the high moun-
tains. i also travelled to other village settings of Badakhshan and to the afghan 
relatives of my respondents, following the family ties of respected families over 
the border. the community i researched comprised predominantly mountain 
dwellers, farmers, and seasonal shepherds. due to the high unemployment rate, 
combined with inefficient mountain agriculture, almost every family in the vil-
lage has one member who migrated abroad in search for work.
Photo 5: shogni girls 
dancing at a folk festival. 
the color red is worn to 
signify celebratory 
occasions, such as 
weddings and traditional 
ceremonies. 
(M. M. biczyk, 2011)
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My proposed research provides an opportunity to examine the correlation 
between, on the one hand, modernisation based on various development 
practices and, on the other, the construction of meaning and the defining of 
boundaries of identity. this correlation between the ‘global’ modernisation 
models and the ‘local’ patterns of living is of great interest to me, especially from 
the point of view of local cultural dynamics and transformations of identity. 
throughout my thesis i also discuss the effects of soviet modernisation and 
the autonomy status on the construction of collective identities. i seek to 
compare different modernisation patterns imposed on the Pamiri people dur-
ing the last century. thus, my research aims to understand both how the local 
people adapt to changes and how they resist them. 
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the kaZak ORALMAN: 
comParing migratorY decisions, 
integration Patterns and 
transnational ties in three 
diFFerent settings
(tabea buri and Peter Finke)
Profile
Tabea Buri studied Social Anthropology, History, and China Studies at the 
University of Zurich (B.A. and M.A.). She is currently an assistant and PhD 
student at the University of Zurich. Her field research focuses on transna-
tional relations, identity issues and migration patterns between Kazakstan 
and Western China. Her current project focuses on the migration situation of 
the Kazak oralman.
the break-up of the soviet union in 1991 has changed the world irrevocably 
and in many different aspects. Besides the transformation of the economic 
and political system it also gave way to large-scale migrations. Following the 
tremendous reshuffling of people during the socialist period, the emergence 
of new independent states out of its former republics have stimulated a flow 
of people, which seems to be in the first place triggered by people’s diaspor-
ic attachments; russians have migrated to russia, germans to germany, and 
Kazaks to Kazakstan.
The latter case is a very specific one in this context. Since the beginning of 
colonial rule and particularly during the soviet period, the proportion of eth-
nic Kazaks had steadily declined due to the influx of Russian and European 
settlers on the one hand and emigration as well as the heavy loss of life 
among Kazaks as a consequence of famines during forced collectivization on 
the other. at the time of independence, in 1991, they made up barely 40 % of 
the total population (svanberg 1996; dave 2007).
many considered this demographic situation as a threat to the stability of 
the country. as a reaction, the government of Kazakstan officially appealed 
to Kazaks all over the world to join their ‘homeland’ (cf. Kuscu 2012). While 
the main aim of this call for repatriation was to raise the proportion of the 
titular ethnic group there was also the hope that the migrants would reacti-
vate Kazak culture and language. Particularly the diasporas in mongolia and 
Photo 1: a pasture area utilised by Kazaks in gansu province, china (t. buri, 2012)
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china were seen as more traditional, while the traditions in today’s Uzbeki-
stan and Kazakstan had come under heavy pressure of Russification during 
the soviet period. even though the vast majority of the diaspora had been 
born outside Kazakstan, the migrants are called oralman upon their arrival, 
meaning ‘repatriants’ in Kazak (Mendikulova 1997).
the diasPora settings
the aim of this project is to compare the fate of Kazaks of different prove-
nance who came or not came to Kazakstan. At the time of the appeal, the 
diaspora comprised approximately four million in total. Roughly half of 
them were citizens of one of the Union’s successor states, with each close to 
one million in russia and Uzbekistan, and smaller groups in Turkmenistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. More than 1.2 millions lived in china, mostly in Xinjiang, 
and some 130,000 in Mongolia (Benson & Svanberg 1998; Finke 1999, 
2004; Bedunah & harris 2005). smaller groups lived in iran, afghanistan, 
turkey and western europe (svanberg 1989; kassymova et al. 2012).
until today, roughly one million people followed the invitation to resettle 
(Tazhibayeva 2010; Usupova 2012), with the bulk of them coming from Uz-
bekistan, mongolia and China. This project will examine in a comparative 
way the motives of Kazaks in these three countries for and against emigrat-
ing as well as their integration in Kazakstan and the developing transnational 
social networks with their places of origin. the three countries each repre-
sent a very distinct case in terms of historical and political background, eco-
nomic incentives and social interrelations.
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mongolia was the major point of origin in the early years of this return 
migration. This was helped by the existence of a bilateral agreement with 
Kazakstan already in the early 1990. Although in absolute terms they cannot 
compare with the diasporas in Uzbekistan, china or russia, they are locally 
important as the largest minority in the country and today, approximately half 
of the mongolian Kazaks has migrated (Finke 1995, 1999, 2004; diener 
2005, 2009; Werner & Barcus 2009; Barcus & werner 2010). For many in 
academia as well as in public, they still represent the paradigmatic case of an 
oralman. Therefore the Mongolian case will serve as a basis of first compari-
sons in this project.
during the same period, the relations between the union’s successor states 
were marked by the ambiguity of political boundaries, and it was thus pos-
sible to move more or less freely between them. But relatively few resettled 
to Kazakstan permanently. Since the end of the 1990s, however, Kazaks from 
Uzbekistan dominated the second wave of oralman, due to the dramatic de-
crease in living standards there (tukumov 2000). Possibly more than half of 
the Kazak population has left Uzbekistan until today and with more than 
600,000 individuals they make up the vast majority of the oralman (kassy-
mova et al. 2012). still, their out-migration has hardly been studied at all.
while immigration from Uzbekistan and mongolia continues, a third wave 
set in recent years with growing numbers of migrants from china. due to an 
unwillingness of the state to let them go, emigration out of China was diffi-
cult for most of the 1990s and early 2000s and has thus been rather low scale 
until around 2005. The exception was a small group of Kazaks in gansu, one 
third of which had migrated to the almaty region during the 1990s (Finke & 
sancak 2005; Finke & Buri forthcoming). in the chinese case the state takes 
a significant role by setting incentives to stay or to leave for different parts of 
the local Kazak populations. Thus, on the one hand, those settling close to the 
border with Kazakstan are now encouraged to leave while the area is reset-
tled with han chinese. on the other hand, Kazaks settling in the interior 
province of gansu are by all means persuaded to stay (Buri 2013).
migratorY decisions
Because of the rare situation of an official invitation for resettlement, the case 
of the Kazak diaspora is particularly interesting as it offers the possibility to 
observe the different variables that influence and restrict migration decisions, 
in other words when and under which circumstances people tend to migrate or 
rather stay. the decision-making process in the diaspora as well as the reason-
ing by migrants in retrospective is therefore the first core theme of this project. 
apart from the bilateral agreements between the states, the respective situation 
in the places of origin shapes the decision for or against migration crucially.
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in all three cases, economic and political motives seem to rank highly, al-
though in different degrees. Kazaks in Mongolia, for example, did not face 
discrimination and most of those who stayed as well as those who left still 
praise the country for its unspoiled nature, democratic achievements and 
peaceful inter-ethnic relations. their motivations to migrate were thus pre-
dominantly economic, leaving Mongolia in a time of crisis. As the first to 
arrive in Kazakstan, Kazaks faced particular hardships and many decided to 
return. this has only changed with the beginning of an economic boom in 
Kazakstan and it may well be that within the next few years the community 
in mongolia will all but disappear (Finke forthcoming).
in Uzbekistan, the devastating economic situation since the later 1990s has 
been a prime motivation for migrating. in addition, in many locations people 
face extremely precarious ecological conditions with little access to drinking 
water and soils depleted by salt and pesticides. in political terms, Uzbekistan 
– in contrast to both mongolia and china – shared a common regime with 
soviet Kazakstan and even today there is little visible discrimination of ka-
zaks (Finke in press).
main reasons for emigration from china seem to differ somewhat from the 
other two cases. while a restrictive policy concerning land use was a major 
argument to leave in the 1990s (Bedunah & harris 2005; Finke & sancak 
2005; cerny 2010), today it is less immediate economic motives. in contrast, 
the situation in china is by most considered superior. however, cultural as-
pects play a major role. other than in Uzbekistan or mongolia, Kazaks in 
china see themselves as discriminated and labelled as less developed than 
the han chinese majority. they fear assimilation as a consequence of chi-
nese dominated school curricula and on-going sedentarization programs. 
thus their motive is rather a hope for a better future of their kids, especially 
as many foresee a prosperous development in Kazakstan after some years 
(Finke & sancak 2005; cerny 2010; Buri 2013).
Patterns oF integration in kaZakstan
as a second focus of the project looks at the patterns of integration the mi-
grants experience, how they differ according to place of origin and destina-
tion as well as what impact they had on the social situation in Kazakstan. The 
situation for most of the migrants is far from ideal and the less than perfect 
integration of these old-new compatriots is one of the hottest debated topics 
in contemporary Kazakstan. Few oralman have been able to successfully 
start a business and in social terms many of them experienced hardships and 
exclusion, exaggerated due to their limited knowledge of Russian. The bu-
reaucracy, problems with housing and jobs, and the omnipresent corruption 
caused additional difficulties.
Photo 2: a family of Kazak oralman from china at their new home in south-eastern 
Kazakstan. After their arrival they tried to sell the traditional handicraft brought along 
but met with little interest among the local population (P. Finke, 1999)
79CASCA
At the same time, the ‘authentic Kazak tradition’ they are supposed to rep-
resent is not equally high on everyone’s agenda and mutual encounters gave 
rise to fierce debates on what proper Kazakness is supposed to mean (Finke 
& sancak 2005; sancak 2007; Diener 2009). Today, cultural influences can 
be discerned with the Kazak language taking ever more prominence in daily 
life and selected issues of (allegedly) cultural traditions also gaining ground. 
still, the impact of the oralman on society in Kazakstan was initially rather 
limited, although it has slowly increased over the last 20 years.
in terms of numbers, however, the estimated one million migrants have 
changed the demographic composition of Kazakstan radically and turned a 
minority of 40 % into an estimated 65 % of the total population. these are, 
however, distributed somewhat uneven throughout the country. the early mi-
grants, in their majority from mongolia, were settled predominantly in the 
country’s northern parts where Kazaks often constituted no more than 20 % 
of the population. this way, it was intended to prevent claims of russian 
nationalists to annex those territories (Finke 1999; diener 2005). in the fol-
lowing years many of them resettled within the country and there is a ten-
dency to concentrate in particular areas or villages.
the majority of the migrants from Uzbekistan live either in the southern 
provinces of Kazakstan or in the oil-extracting regions along the coast of the 
Caspian Sea. There, existing kin relations across the border alleviate the in-
tegration to some degree as this formed a contiguous space before the draw-
ing of modern boundaries. nevertheless, tensions seem to be the case both 
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with the local population as with Kazakstanian officials especially for those 
who have not yet received citizenship. Compared with others, the integration 
of Kazaks from Uzbekistan is somewhat smoother due to their comprehen-
sion of the Russian language and existing kin relations. On the other hand, 
the southern provinces are already densely populated and suffer from the 
nearby border being far from easy accessible.
oralman from china predominantly settle in the neighbouring south-east-
ern parts of Kazakstan and in particular in and around the provincial capital 
of taldykorgan. interestingly, many of the respective villages had been popu-
lated mainly by russians until the 1990s and are advantaged in terms of soil 
and water, as these had been the sites the first settlers in the 19th century 
preferred. thus, ecologically speaking migrants from china are often fa-
voured towards the local population. they have also the reputation of being 
not only most traditional but also hardworking and entrepreneurial. never-
theless, their situation is often far from prosperous. although many of them 
belong to the same lineages as local Kazaks in the Taldykorgan region, 
namely the nayman clan and its numerous sub-divisions, they usually lack 
traceable kin relations. Furthermore, their knowledge of russian is usually 
poor or non-existent and most of them can hardly read Kazak in Cyrillic let-
ters thus placing them at a disadvantage compared to those from Uzbekistan 
or mongolia (Finke & sancak 2005).
Many of the migrants face severe difficulties in adapting to their new envi-
ronment and express a profound disappointment about the state of Kazak-
stan. They do not only feel openly rejected but experience discomfort as they 
are confronted with a distinct institutional settings where they do not know 
the rules of the game properly. to deal with this, migrants can either try to 
learn and adapt or make an effort to change the existing institutional frame-
work. this is done, as was shown by previous research, by bargaining on 
what it means to be a proper Kazak (Finke & sancak 2005). ones own dis-
advantages, like not speaking russian, are thereby turned into an ideal of 
ethnic purity. these identity games, as we may call them, are at the same time 
the basis of mutual misunderstandings and processes of intra-ethnic differen-
tiation without, however, questioning the fundamental attachment to the 
same group. the latter, as has been argued, is based on a cognitive schema 
that takes assumed genealogical, or indeed genetic ties as the defining crite-
rion rather than common language or culture (Finke in press).
transnational ties to the Places oF origin
closely connected to the issue of integration is the question about the transna-
tional ties. For many of the migrants the relations to their place of origin is still 
very if not far more important than the social ties to local Kazaks. In the Mon-
Photo 3: Taxis on the market in Olgiy, western mongolia, waiting for customers to be 
taken to Kazakstan (P. Finke, 2011)
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golian case, the only one, which has been studied in that respect, transnational 
ties with the relatives left behind, are very intense (Werner & Barcus 2009; 
Barcus & werner 2010; Finke forthcoming). one hypothesis is that the institu-
tional unfamiliarity is one of the main reasons why transnational ties remained 
so important or, in fact, became ever more. it is with people from ‘home’, both 
those who came along with oneself and those who stayed behind, that one feels 
most comfortable. these relations are maintained by new communication 
technologies and back- and forth movements across the borders.
Thereby – to some extent – the concept of a Kazak nation-state as such is 
challenged and instead the connection to the land where one was born is 
emphasised (Dubuisson & Genina 2011; Finke & Buri forthcoming). more 
important for the transnational fields, we will argue, is a kind of ‘institu-
tional familiarity’. People feel much more comfortable with their visiting 
relatives from mongolia or Uzbekistan. This perception is obviously 
strengthened by a sense of being rejected by local society (Finke forthcom-
ing). at the same time, these ties allow people to make strategic use of 
boundaries by commuting back and forth in a way locals are not able to.
Moreover, transnational ties are crucial for the flow of information from 
Kazakstan to the respective places of origin. The image of Kazakstan, which is 
thereby transmitted to the one’s left behind forms the basis of further decision 
for or against migration. at the same time, stories about the places left behind 
may influence the oralman’s satisfaction or disappointment about their current 
situation in Kazakstan and consequently the patterns of integration.
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project deals with a squatter settlement in the capital of Bishkek.
the famous russian saying in the title of this essay was used by one of my 
informants to emphasize that ‘city building’ is a long and complex process. 
Kyrgyzstan’s capital and largest city, Bishkek, has been expanding rapidly in 
recent times, both physically and demographically. the city’s population is 
estimated to have surpassed one million, and in doing so has exceeded the 
capacity of Bishkek’s infrastructure. This explosive population growth, driv-
en by migration within Kyrgyzstan in search of better economic opportunities, 
has led to the emergence of settlements along the city’s periphery. locals refer 
to such settlements as zhany konush (Kyrgyz) or novostroika (russian). 
i distinguish among three types of internal migrants in Bishkek. The first 
type comprises those migrants who live in comfortable apartments in the city 
center. The second are migrants who live in the publicly recognized settle-
ments of Bishkek, with access to both social and physical infrastructures. 
These settlements emerged during the final years of the soviet union and 
shortly after its dissolution (1989 – 91). lastly, there are the migrants who live 
in the peripheral settlements, which appeared in the early years of 2000 and 
especially during the spring of 2005 in the aftermath of the so-called tulip 
revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Significant areas of these ‘new’ settlements are il-
legal – that is, unauthorized and thus not recognized by the city municipality. 
most of the migrants cannot afford to reside in the city center because of 
the relatively high cost of rental property, nor even in the formal settlements, 
and thus are forced to seek low-cost accommodations in the informal settle-
ments along the outskirts of Bishkek (hirt and stanilov, 2009). Balihar sang-
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hera (2011) argues that the shortage of public housing, the fragile rural econ-
omy, the rapidly growing urban population, and the weak capacity of the 
state all need to be taken into consideration when discussing the informal 
settlements in Bishkek and their proliferation. 
this essay focuses on one such peripheral settlement, which is referred to 
here as ‘Kyzyl Zher’ for purposes of confidentiality. I begin by providing a 
brief narrative of the origins of Kyzyl Zher. 
Extending the geographic range of the so-called ‘colour revolutions’, which 
began with the rose revolution in georgia in 2003 and the orange revolu-
tion in ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan was the third country in the post-Soviet 
sphere and the first in the Central Asian region to experience a popular revolt. 
Kyrgyzstan’s ‘revolution’ occurred in the spring of 2005 and later came to be 
known as the Tulip Revolution. As in the first two cases, political turmoil in 
Kyrgyzstan led to a change in power: the former president of the country, 
askar akaev, left the country in the midst of the unrest, and it took some time 
before the opposition decided on kurmanbek Bakiev to lead the interim gov-
ernment. this political instability and the resulting power vacuum provoked 
chaos in Bishkek: while the city center was unceremoniously looted, Kyrgyz 
citizens – squatters in this case – took advantage of the unsettled situation 
and the fragility of state institutions to occupy land on the outskirts of the city 
and establish residence without waiting for any kind of formal recognition of 
their right to do so.
one such squatter settlement in Bishkek is Kyzyl Zher, which sprang into 
existence in the spring of 2005 in the immediate aftermath of the tulip rev-
olution. The extensive territory previously had been leased for fifty years by 
a politician, who had planned to build a market there but never succeeded in 
the endeavour. the territory belongs to the chui district, in which Bishkek is 
located, and not to the city of Bishkek itself, but the district administration 
disavowed responsibility for Kyzyl Zher, claiming to lack the financial re-
sources to provide the new settlement with support and services. thus, Kyzyl 
Zher has remained in an ambivalent position since its emergence, acknowl-
edged neither by the district of chui nor by the city of Bishkek. 
while the current population of Kyzyl Zher is officially estimated at about 
seven thousand, unofficial estimates are closer to ten thousand. The residents 
of Kyzyl Zher are migrants from within Kyrgyzstan, most of whom had al-
ready been living in Bishkek for many years but did not have a house of their 
own. instead, they had been renting small and poorly furnished rooms from 
house owners in the other formalised settlements (sanghera, 2010). People 
refer to one of these small rooms as a kvartira1, and those who rent a kvartira 
1   Kvartira is russian for ‘apartment’. it implies an apartment in a multistory house. 
In the context of the settlements, kvartira denotes a small room or a shack that can 
be rented out to tenants. 
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are kvartiranttar. But renting a kvartira brings with it the constant threat of 
eviction for any number of reasons, such as a late rental payment, the inap-
propriate behaviour of tenants, new plans of a landlord, and so on. thus, a 
kvartira cannot be regarded as a long-term dwelling. moreover, in a kvartira 
most migrants feel constrained, living under the watchful ‘eye’ of the land-
lord. to list but a few of the numerous restrictions, the tenants are not al-
lowed to host many relatives in their small rooms, their children cannot make 
too much noise, and they cannot overuse electricity by watching television 
until late at night. therefore, the kvartiranttar have always wanted to have 
their own home – to be free from dependence on a landlord, from insecurity 
and fear, and from the intermittent, often unpredictable movement from 
kvartira to kvartira. 
Facing diFFiculties 
From Kyzyl Zher’s beginnings in 2005 to late 2011, the residents of the 
settlement lived without any state-provided infrastructure to deliver the fun-
damental necessities, that is, electricity and drinking water. as a solution to 
the lack of drinking water, Kyzyl Zher inhabitants bought water from sellers 
who came to the settlement with minibuses full of water in containers. the 
cost of water was 50 tyiyns (ca. 1 us cent) per litre. minibus drivers had a 
decided market advantage: by transporting water, a scarce resource, to the 
settlement, they could demand a high price for it.2 the problem with electric-
ity was more difficult to solve. The dwellers of Kyzyl Zher relied on private 
generators (dvizhok), which produced sufficient power to light the house dur-
ing the evening but not enough to allow people to watch television or have a 
running refrigerator. often, my informants referred to themselves as ‘back-
ward’ because they were not up-to-date with the country’s news since they 
could not watch television. similarly, they were also concerned for the future 
of their children, for whom life in Kyzyl Zher also led to ‘backwardness’. 
sarcastically, people also joked that the lack of electricity was a driving fac-
tor of the population increase in Kyzyl Zher because they had no choice but 
to go to bed early. 
since there was no central heating in Kyzyl Zher, houses were heated using 
coal, which was expensive for the locals. An entire house could be used only 
in the warmer months; during the winter the family lived in the limited num-
2   water in Kyrgyzstan is not sold by the litre. Typically, at the end of each month, 
people receive a bill for the water they have used. The approximate price for water 
in Bishkek is 6 soms per cubic metre (one thousand litres); 6 soms are equal to 
about 12 us cents. the average amount of water per person is 3–3.5 cubic metres. 
if Kyzyl Zher residents use 30 litres of water per day, it will cost them 450 soms at 
the end of the month. 
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ber of rooms (usually one or two) that they could afford to heat. Furthermore, 
most houses in Kyzyl Zher lacked thermo-insulation, and thus the heat pro-
duced by coal escaped too easily through the walls. cooking was done in a 
coal- or gas-powered oven. while such measures solved the basic problem, 
the settlement dwellers lamented the high cost. 
Worn down by the lack of basic infrastructure and by their makeshift, ex-
pensive efforts to fend off the cold of winter and the heat of summer, Kyzyl 
Zher residents organised numerous demonstrations to meet with high-rank-
ing state officials and explain their difficult circumstances in the hope of ac-
quiring electricity and water. the promises by politicians they received in 
return proved empty, however, and the situation did not improve. the settle-
ment residents even attempted once to block one of the main roads within 
Bishkek, which not only has internal significance but external as well, con-
necting Kyrgyzstan with Kazakstan and Uzbekistan; the state military used 
violence to quickly disperse the demonstrators. 
in april 2010, Kyrgyzstan’s second president, Bakiev, who as mentioned 
above had come to power in 2005, was overthrown. in june of that same year, 
so-called ‘ethnic conflict’ between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks took place, with trag-
ic consequences for many. even though this ethnic clash happened in the 
south, and not near Bishkek (located in the north), it still had an indirect in-
fluence on Kyrgyzstan as a whole because the country found itself in a pre-
carious situation once again. in addition, increasingly frequent political pro-
tests in Bishkek posed the danger of even greater instability. during such a 
‘fragile’ moment, Kyzyl Zher residents engaged in another large-scale politi-
cal protest. namely, in september 2011, they blocked the above-mentioned 
strategically significant road in Bishkek for several days, burning tyres in the 
middle of the roadway. the protesters demanded the provision of basic infra-
structure and the formal recognition of their settlement. Fed up with past 
promises that had not been kept, they decided that blocking the road was the 
quickest and most effective way to force state officials to respond to their 
plight. ‘if we had not blocked this road, we would not have gotten electricity 
and water even in twenty years’, said one of my informants, who actively 
participated in the protest. Indeed, Prime Minister Almazbek Atambaev and 
Bishkek’s mayor, isa omurkulov, arrived to meet with the protestors. having 
listened to their complaints and demands, the officials promised the rapid 
resolution of their problems. 
Following atambaev’s order, Kyzyl Zher residents gained access to elec-
tricity and water towards the end of december 2011. however, not every 
household could light their homes and some still transported water over a 
significant distance. The city’s given reason for this continued lack of ser-
vices, as explained to the locals of Kyzyl Zher, was inadequate finances in the 
city budget. one of my informants told me that the city administration had 
allocated 36 million soms (approx. $US 80,000) for Kyzyl Zher: 16 million 
Photo 1: electricians having lunch in the house of a Kyzyl Zher resident after their 
work in the settlement.  (e. iSabaeva, 2012)
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for electrification, 10 million for water, and 10 million for paving the central 
road of the settlement. this amount was soon depleted, leaving the work only 
partially completed. The locals were told to wait until the finalization of a 
new budget, while ‘off the record’ it was suggested that they consider financ-
ing the rest of the work themselves. 
co-eXistence oF Formal and inFormal rules
given the neglect by the Kyrgyz state with regard to illegal squatter settle-
ments on the one hand and its lenient policy towards them on the other, Kyzyl 
Zher residents have essentially been left to govern themselves. to do so, they 
have relied on formal rules and created their own informal rules. the result-
ant formal and informal practices have not come into conflict with one an-
other, but rather have proven complementary and, most importantly, have 
achieved wide acceptance. thus, these practices shape everyday life in Kyzyl 
Zher. 
when speaking of informal rules, i refer to helmke and levitsky (2003: 
724), who define them as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned chan-
nels”. The following provides some examples of informal rules in Kyzyl 
Zher and how they peacefully coexist alongside formal rules. 
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One example concerns the buying and selling of a house in Kyzyl Zher and 
emphasises the crucial role of neighbours. Since residents lack official docu-
mentation verifying their house ownership, it is often problematic to sell or 
buy a house in the settlement. thus, the function typically served by a prop-
erty title is assumed by one’s neighbours, whereby the potential buyer first 
consults with neighbours to make sure that the house to be sold in fact be-
longs to the seller. once the deal is done, the new house owner receives from 
the former owner a raspiska, a document on a sheet of paper in which the 
seller records in his own words the sale and its terms. sometimes both parties 
have the raspiska certified at a notary office, which reinforces the legitimacy 
of the raspiska and can aid in resolving disputes should they arise afterward. 
similarly, the widely accepted practice of consulting with neighbours prior to 
the sale is undertaken primarily to avoid potential conflicts following the sale. 
another informal arrangement concerns electricity usage in the settlement. 
since not everyone has gained access to electricity in Kyzyl Zher, those who 
have access kindly share with those who do not. For example, those house-
holds located far from the central street of Kyzyl Zher, where all of the elec-
trical pylons have been placed, receive their electricity from households 
closer to the central street. In exchange, those borrowers either divide among 
themselves the bill for the electricity at the end of the month, excluding the 
share of the electricity-providing household, or all households share the pay-
ment equally. needless to say, this has an impact on the amount of electricity 
used, and leads to frequent breakdowns due to the overloaded capacity of the 
high-voltage substations. when power is interrupted in the settlement, a team 
of electricians comes to Kyzyl Zher to repair the overwhelmed substations. 
once power is restored, the residents show their gratitude by inviting the 
electricians to lunch or dinner in their homes, during which time they estab-
lish close relationships with the electricians, whose help is always in high 
demand in Kyzyl Zher. 
Yet another example of informal rules concerns the ‘big man’ of Kyzyl 
Zher, who serves as the coordinator of the settlement and as its representative 
in meetings with state officials. He was chosen as the coordinator of the set-
tlement during a general meeting in Kyzyl Zher by majority vote. He ex-
plained this choice of the people by the fact that, as opposed to other mi-
grants, he was a knowledgeable person with work experience in the legal 
system. While conflict resolution is not among the established duties of the 
coordinator, residents of Kyzyl Zher first and foremost turn to him whenever 
they have a conflict. Conflicts are quite frequent in the settlement and quite 
varied – land disputes, family conflicts, criminal offences such as theft and 
physical altercations. the coordinator attempts to solve problems internally, 
i.e., without involving the police or the courts, both of which represent the 
state and its formal procedures. Only when conflicting sides do not agree to 
his proposed solution does the coordinator either call in the police or refer the 
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case to the courts. the coordinator is not paid by the state, and therefore at a 
general meeting it was decided by a majority of the settlement residents that 
each household would contribute a certain amount to serve as a salary for the 
coordinator and his assistants. 
conclusion
in this short essay, i have attempted to provide a glimpse into the everyday 
life of Kyzyl Zher, which remains a de jure illegal squatter settlement on the 
outskirts of Bishkek. there are many similar settlements in and around the 
city. even though i do not assert that Kyzyl Zher is representative of all such 
settlements in Bishkek, there are many problems that most periphery settle-
ments share. Despite all of the persisting difficulties in Kyzyl Zher, the resi-
dents have not become disheartened; on the contrary, they continue to hope 
for a better and brighter future. Because there now exists at least a basic 
level of infrastructure in the settlement, i. e., electricity and drinking water, 
and living conditions have comparatively improved, it is predicted by some 
that the population in Kyzyl Zher will increase in the coming years. In this 
struggle for a decent life in the settlement, Kyzyl Zher residents seek to 
achieve the status of fully recognised residents of Bishkek. 
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summarY
the principal aim of this project is to carry out Phd research regarding the 
historical construction of social space and identity narratives in the inter-
ethnic context of South-eastern Kazakstan and Northern Kyrgyzstan during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Specifically, I intend to study the cultural exchanges and adaptations by 
which dungan (muslim hui) people established its territorial identities in the 
region of kordai (Kazakstan) and tokmok (Kyrgyzstan) following various 
migratory displacements which have brought them together at various mo-
ments between the 1870s and 1960s. in particular, i am interested in recon-
structing the forms of self-representation among, those dungan groups who 
arrived in 1878 from the Chinese region of Shaanxi and arrived to masanchi 
and sortobe (contemporary Kazakstan), tokmok, and the area surrounding 
Bishkek (contemporary Kyrgyzstan).
One of the main objectives of this research is to problematise existing ideas 
regarding the perceived ease with which dungan and other ethnic groups are 
able to adapt to a multi-ethnic setting in a quasi-national context of shifting 
territorial identities. at a broader theoretical level, this analysis aims at con-
tributing fresh insights and methods for the study of migrant communities 
and so-called stateless societies.
Photo 1: dungan Bride, 
sortobe 
(S. J. tovar, 2013)
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historical setting: 
dungan migrations oF the 19th and 20th centuries
After the expansion of the Qing Dynasty towards its Inner Asian borders in 
the mid-eighteenth century, at the initiative of Emperor Qianlong (1711 – 1799), 
there were several local revolts against the chinese presence in what came to 
be known as the western regions of the middle kingdom.1 however, it was 
not until the expansion of the Russian empire into Central Asia, at the ex-
pense of the territories occupied by china, that china began to show concern 
about the destabilizing potential of these uprisings. By the mid-nineteenth 
century, there were clearly defined Russian and Chinese zones of influence in 
the territories referred to by imperial russia as ‘turkestan’. at this time, china 
began to consolidate its influence and authority in the region currently known 
as Xinjiang province (which was not officially named Xinjiang until 1884). 
1   By western regions (西域; xī yù), I refer generally to the territories that run from the  
central area of the current Prc to various parts of the modern nation-states of 
afghanistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, tajikistan, turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
mongolia.
Photo 2: dungan women, Bular Batyr  (S. J. tovar, 2012)
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In turn, Russia began to expand into the present-day territories of Kazakstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and tajikistan.
during this period – between 1862 and 1877 – there were a series of riots 
staged by some of the Hui and Uighur communities subject to Qing authority. 
these riots were precipitated by, and related more broadly to, the internal 
territorial reshuffling that followed the Tongzhi restoration, and took place 
during the time in which china was being subjected to the various strategies 
and positionings of the western imperial powers (wright, 1957; Perdue, 
2005). It is within this context that some of the migrations mentioned above 
took place.
according to svetlana rimsky-korsakoff dyer (1992), during the nineteenth 
century there were two broad migratory movements undertaken by some uighur 
and chinese muslim communities (the latter of which are commonly known 
as ‘Hui zu’ (回族) in china, and ‘dungan’ in russia and the post-soviet re-
publics of central asia).2 The first of these movements took place after the 
Qing authorities crushed a Muslim rebellion in 1878, and shortly after the 
formal division of the inner asian region by russia and china.
2   in order to differentiate the hui ethnic group living in china, from the muslim chinese 
settled in the Central Asian countries, for the former, I use the term Hui or Huizu; 
for the last, i use dungan.
Photo 3: dungan groom, 
sortobe 
(S. J. tovar, 2012)
96 Current Projects
PrinciPal aims oF this research Project
The main purpose of this research is to carry out ethnographic and historical field 
research in and around the townships of masanchi and sortobe, in Kazakstan, 
and tokmok and Bishkek, in Kyrgyzstan, the descendants of the dungan 
migrants mentioned above.
there are several reasons for having chosen these as my primary sites of 
interest:
First, in the case of masanchi and sortobe, these towns present a singular 
example of a minority inside the minority, since they are inhabited by Shaanxi 
dungans and the gansu Dungan language and culture were the ‘official’ dur-
ing the soviet period. this may indicate that local people’s relationship with 
respect to their surrounding social space is distinct from those who are the 
‘canonic’. nevertheless, both places are located in the ‘dungan core area’, 
i. e. around tokmok (Kyrgyzstan), and this factor let us think about a trans-
border Dungan community. This situation may help to explain the linguistic 
continuity of Chinese and Russian as extant languages among the members 
of the dungan community of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan.
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the dungan community of the Zhambyl Province has consistently shown a 
certain reluctance to coexist (e. g. intermarry, trade, enter into cultural borrowings) 
with other ethnic groups in the region. thus, while other migrant groups, such 
as Uighurs, have absorbed the particularities of Russian, Kazak and Kyrgyz 
cuisine and clothing, and communicate often with these groups in their respective 
languages, the dungans continue to hold to their own styles of clothing, cooking 
and oral traditions. it is for this reason that i am interested in comparing both 
of these groups and exploring the multifarious ways in which different ethnic 
groups in the china-Central Asia-Russian context adapt and coexist.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the dungans of Kazakstan have never 
previously been the subject of detailed research, and have only been mentioned 
in the extant scholarly literature as part of other broader research regarding 
dungan populations in the region (allès, 2005), and there were no comparisons 
with the Kyrgyzstani Dungans case. Given the scant volume of publications 
regarding the history and self-representations of dungan communities in 
central asia, i hope to produce novel and more detailed data that may allow 
for a more nuanced and critical analysis of the existence of these groups in such 
a multi-ethnic and shifting context. Importantly, I already had an opportunity 
to approach these communities and to begin to establish lasting and important 
ties with its members as a result of the work that i undertook recently (2007 – 2009) 
in relation to my Master’s dissertation (cf. Jiménez tovar, 2009).
hYPothesis
the main working hypothesis which i intend to put to the test throughout of 
this project is:
 ▫  Dungans have had greater difficulty in coexisting alongside the multi-ethnic 
contexts of the Kazak society, first, because the Dungans are ethnically and 
culturally more related to china. hence, there are many cultural characteristics, 
or type features, that they appear to share with the major population of the 
Prc – such as ancestor worship, mythological references, language, dress, 
cooking, among others. whether these shared cultural characteristics are 
relevant or not, Dungans certainly appear to have faced greater difficulties in 
learning and incorporating local central asian (mainly turkic) languages into 
their everyday lives, and, conversely, they have focused more on retaining 
their original cultural archetypes. this practice of ‘cultural conservation’ 
may have encouraged Dungan groups to be less willing to coexist with the 
multi-ethnic communities of their host society. consequently, some of the 
groups inhabiting the Zhambyl oblast’ perceive the dungans as alien, making 
it even harder for members of the dungan community to enter more broadly 
into the multi-ethnic milieu of Kazakstan.
Photo 4: cooking momo, 
sortobe 
(S. J. tovar, 2012)
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in sum, the setting for this study will be masanchi and sortobe in Kazakstan 
and tokmok in Kyrgyzstan. The subject of my project will be those groups 
with origins in china who migrated within the past century and a half to 
multi-ethnic contexts in central asia. in this case, i am interested in the dungan 
population that originated in Gansu and Shaanxi, and whose arrival in the region 
of study took place as a result of various forced displacements provoked, 
respectively, by the muslim rebellions in china (1862 – 1877) and the founding 
of the Prc (1949).
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khoja in kaZakstan: 
identitY transFormations
( aziM Malikov)
Profile
Azim Malikov received his PhD in History in 2000. From 2005 until 2010, he 
was an Associate Professor at the Department of History and Philosophy at 
Samarkand State University. His field research focuses on the area of Uzbek-
istan, Kazakstan and Afghanistan. So far, Azim Malikov focuses on identity is-
sues linked to history and politics as well as transformation processes of urban 
and rural post-Soviet societies from the 18th century onwards. His current pro-
ject deals with transformation tendencies of Khoja identities in Kazakstan.
Following the influential work of Fredrik Barth (1969), among others, many 
contemporary ethnicity debates revolve around how group boundaries are 
socially constructed. Understanding processes of identification requires fa-
miliarity with the contexts in which they occur (Donahoe [et al.] 2009: 10). 
While ethnic groups have been the main focus of study among ethnologists 
interested in social identity, the study of lower level social units, e. g. clans 
and lineages, is also important for understanding identity formation process-
es. The same clan can frequently be found in more than one ethnic group 
(Schlee 1994: 2 – 5).
nowadays, Uzbeks, Kazaks, turkmens, and tajiks in central asia share a 
number of distinct groups – khojas1, some lineages of which occur in two or 
more ethnic groups. a lineage is usually taken to be a group of people, who 
trace their descent unilineally from a common ancestor through a series of 
links that can be enumerated (holy 1998: 74 – 75). the purpose of my project 
was to investigate inter-ethnic relationships and identity options among the 
religious elite groups of Khoja in Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and Afghanistan. 
in the pre-soviet period, the religious elite groups (Sayyid, Khoja, Ishon, 
etc.) formed a particularly privileged group in the social hierarchy of muslim 
communities and were much respected by the believers. the emphasis of the 
study lay on changes in identity and its expressions among different groups 
1   the term Khoja, Khwaja has been taken to imply, variously, descent from ‘arabs’,  
descent from the Prophet or Ali, descent from the first caliphs, or descent from 
islamising saints. the term Khoja (which means ‘master’ in Persian) was mentioned  
in written sources from the 10th century, when it was used for certain government 
officials. The term Khoja as the name of a religious descent group started to be used  
since the 15th century.
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of Khoja in the abovementioned countries during the 20th century and the 
contemporary period. one can compare the transformation of identities in 
sedentary society, including the Khoja, in Uzbekistan. In Kazakstan, I stud-
ied Khoja identity in a specific society of descendants of nomadic tribes. In 
afghanistan, there is a society maintaining more traditional features than 
those in the post-soviet central asian countries. the comparative research 
was valuable for the understanding of identity construction processes in cen-
tral asia in the current period.
the project analysed different variables of the respective manifestation of 
Khoja identity and its variations. the concept of being Khoja provides an 
excellent case for studying the trans-ethnic character of the group. It enables 
a systematic comparison of the factors and variables that influence how 
group identities and social networks are formed and demarcated. 
The genealogies (nasab-nama) of some Khoja groups make clear that the 
present genealogical charters of some Khoja communities typically empha-
sise descent from an intermediate saintly figure, from whom a particular 
Khoja group will often take its specific name (DeWeese 1999: 507 – 508). 
According to traditionalist Islamic doctrine, there can be no more prophets, 
however, in Sufi traditions the world and human society still require spiritual 
guides and guardians: walis (‘friends’ of God), each assigned a specific ter-
ritory of the world to watch over (Ewing 1983: 254). 
Khoja fulfilled eminent religious and social duties in Central Asian society 
and were held in very high esteem in the pre-Soviet period. They performed 
religious services at ritual celebrations, acted as healers, and were addressed 
to settle disputes. In addition, Khojas have been the care-takers of Sufi 
shrines. In the pre-Soviet period, the Kazak steppe priests – mullahs were 
almost always Khojas, and the pir (spiritual leader) of a Kazak clan or vil-
lage would surely be only from among the Khoja (Privatsky 2004: 167).
I attempted to analyse these inter-ethnic descent group relationships and 
identity issues by a combination of two methods: the evaluation of historical 
accounts and cultural comparison. I undertook fieldwork in southern Kazak-
stan. I chose the Turkestan region of Kazakstan for obvious reasons, it is the 
famous religious centre where many Khojas of various lineages and ethnic 
affiliation are concentrated. I attempted to study not only Khoja identity ex-
pression but also the interplay of multiple identities in the process of interac-
tion of various groups. 
Categorising Khoja according to linguistic principles, one can find the fol-
lowing groups in Central Asia: the Uzbek-speaking, the Kazak-speaking, the 
Tajik-speaking, and the Turkmen-speaking Khoja. Some of them are bilin-
gual speaking both Uzbek and Tajik or both Kazak and Uzbek. If there are 
enough other elements (political, economic, or cultural) on which a feeling 
of ethnic belonging and commonality is based, such an ethnic unit can toler-
ate a high degree of linguistic diversity. For Khojas, it is a real or imagined 
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or constructed idea of common origin, genealogies. In order to differentiate 
various groups of Khoja, I use two criteria: descent and language. My con-
clusion is that the group relationships between some lineages of the Uzbek-
speaking, the Kazak-speaking, and the Tajik-speaking Khojas, i. e. the de-
scent group relationships, are due to a real or believed common origin. The 
strongest arguments for a common origin have been derived from compari-
sons of group-specific cultural features. Common origins and subsequent 
splits are also reported by oral history, so the two utilised types of evidence 
confirm one another. 
In order to understand the Khoja as a privileged social group, we need to shed 
some light on the concept of status groups. Max Weber defines status group as a 
group of people (part of a society) that can be differentiated on the basis of non-
economical qualities like honour, prestige, and religion (Gerth 1958: 186 – 187). 
However, it was not possible to be a member of a Khoja descent group, which 
had hereditary rights. 
Various identities become applicable in various situations. In a considered 
interval of time, we choose one or a limited number of identities as leading. 
In some situations we want to note distinction, and in others we look for 
something general or a general affiliation. Groups in certain conditions can 
keep their clan identity after an ethnic reaffiliation (Schlee 1994: 234). Col-
lective identities are articulated with reference to various dimensions, (na-
tionality, ethnicity, kinship, language, religion, local or regional origins, 
etc.), which are themselves complexly structured and may be combined in 
various ways. Within the range of options of identification, special attention 
has to be paid to the size of the groups or categories defined by alternative 
identity concepts. In my case studies, one can differentiate identities on vari-
ous levels, which include ethnic identities (e. g. Kazak, Uzbek, Arab), civic 
identity (e. g. Kazakstani), or regional identities of various levels. There are 
also other levels of identities, which include tribal and clan identities or Kho-
ja lineages and sub-lineages, particularly among Kazak-speaking Khojas. 
Locality, as well as other aspects, can be significant identity generating fac-
tors. Manipulation of the group size or alliances of groups have great value. 
I analysed the policy of size: inclusion and exclusion through marriage strat-
egies and individual manipulations. 
Following the conclusions by Schlee and Donahoe on how trans-ethnic 
groups came into being in Africa and Siberia (Donahoe/Schlee: 79 – 80), I 
found that interethnic Khoja identity in Central Asia was forming in three 
different ways: 1. Khoja predate the present-day ethnic groups Kazak, Tajik, 
and Uzbek. 2. After the boundaries between the modern ethnic groups had 
started to develop, individuals or groups have crossed them and affiliated 
themselves with another ethnic group. In the cases in which they nomadised 
with distinct cultural features, they did not give up their original affiliation. 
3. In the course of the establishment of the Kazak khanate (starting in the 15th 
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century), non-Kazak holy lineages were allotted to certain Kazak clans on 
whom they became economically dependent. These collective adoptions did 
not supersede the older clan relationships by descent or putative descent, 
particularly in urban areas and adjacent territories. 
In the pre-Soviet period, the identities like tribal, clan, locality, family, etc. 
were more important for the Central Asian population of the region in deter-
mining loyalties than ethnic origin. Along with the question of blurred 
boundaries between ethnic groups, there was the matter of multiple levels of 
identity. While discussing the role of the state in identity formation, Barth 
notes, “the state is a specifiable third player in the processes of boundary 
construction between groups” (Barth 1994: 19). In 1924, the existing politi-
cal-administrative organisation was broken up by the national delimitation of 
Central Asia and replaced by ethnically defined republics. Language was 
viewed as the central criterion for affiliation to one or another ethnic group 
(Gero 2007: 21, 24). This laid the structural foundations for the reformula-
tion of the parameters of identity. Tribal/regional designations were now sub-
sumed under institutionalised ‘nationalities’ (e. g. Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik, 
etc.) (Akiner 1998: 12 – 13). 
In the 1920s and 1930s, Khojas were persecuted and expropriated. A sig-
nificant number of Central Asian Khoja intellectuals were arrested and killed, 
especially if they were mullahs or Islamic scholars. It appears that the less 
distinguished and well-to-do Khoja families were more likely to escape per-
secution. Some generations later, Khojas joined the Communist Party, thus 
gaining the same high social status and prosperity that their ancestors had 
enjoyed as religious authorities. In my opinion, some Khoja groups suffered 
from cultural trauma in the early Soviet period. For privileged Khoja groups, 
the traumatogenic change was loss of property as a result of state policy and 
the breakdown of the political and economic regime. 
The Soviet policy to homogenise the society in Central Asia and to create 
national identities could not eliminate some specific identities in the region. 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian 
republics in 1991, Khojas, particularly in Kazakstan, have recovered some of 
their former prestige. 
All Khojas I talked to in Turkestan had their genealogies. Some of them 
claimed to be descendants of the Prophet through his son-in-law Caliph Ali.2 
The purpose of genealogies was not simply to show the line of relatives, but 
also to show people who is a descendant of the Prophet or of Caliphs, whom 
they must respect. 
Among Uzbeks in Kazakstan, internal differentiation has traditionally 
been organised according to regional origin, i. e. Turkistonlik, Qarnoqlik, etc. 
Regional identities still play a more important role. Most people preferred to 
2   interview turkestan, november 2010.
105CASCA
classify themselves primarily in local terms than as Turkestanian or depend-
ing on their origin within the province. The Uzbek-speaking Khojas of 
Turkestan city claimed to be descendants of Sufi leaders; Ali Khoja, Sadr ata, 
etc. According to the oral tradition, some Khojas came from Bukhara in the 
19th century. Some groups of Uzbek-speaking Khoja of Turkestan intermarry 
with the Kazak-speaking Khoja. During the interviews, Khoja often were 
confused with ethnic categories. Some respondents doubted that Kazaks 
have Khoja groups, and vice versa some Kazak-speaking Khoja did not un-
derstand questions about ‘Uzbek’ Khojas. Turkestan Khojas had close rela-
tionships and marriages with Samarkand, Tashkent, and Bukhara Khojas in 
the past. In the 1930s, many of them left Turkestan for Samarkand and Tash-
kent. As one of my informants mentioned: “There are no Kazak or Uzbek 
Khojas, all of them belong to a single Khoja group. So-called ‘Uzbek’ and 
‘Kazak’ Khojas are a result of the Soviet nationalities policy”.3 I observed 
also another case. In elaborating the specific Kazak-Khoja qualities, some 
Khoja very often seek to distinguish themselves from Uzbek Khojas, as the 
following statement by an informant exemplifies: “The Kazak-Khojas know 
their seven ancestors; they have higher moral values and sincerity. The ‘Uz-
bek Khojas’ are completely different people.”4 But this is not to say that 
Khojas distinguish themselves less from Kazaks, exactly the opposite is true. 
It rather seems that Kazak-Khojas feel more of a need to distinguish them-
selves from Uzbek-Khojas with whom they have much more in common. 
Next to the pure genetic explanation for the specific Khoja qualities, some 
Khojas also mention their particular history and also religious values. 
Endogamous marriages prevail among the Uzbek-speaking Khojas con-
trary to descendants of nomadic, Kazak-speaking Khojas. This seems rather 
contradictory, when the Kazak Khojas discuss the fact that the Prophet gave 
his daughter to his cousin Ali. However, the influence of nomadic Kazak 
traditions is strong among the Kazak Khojas. Some Kazak-speaking Khoja 
like Akkurgan and Khorasan Khojas stigmatise endogamous marriages as 
‘the Uzbek custom’. The situation in Turkistan city is different because of 
long-term interactions between Kazak-speaking and Uzbek-speaking Kho-
jas. 
I also observed that in the Uzbek society in Qarnak village, which is near 
Turkestan, a local Khoja community had started to intermarry with non-Kho-
ja groups since the 1970s/80s.
Although Khojas logically have an Arab as an ancestor, in Kazakstan, only 
some of them consider themselves to be Arabs. Indeed, given the vast range 
of physical types and different native languages (none Arabic) found among 
3   Interview, native of Turkestan, claimed to be a descendant of Sufi leader khoja 
ahmad Yassavi. december 2010.
4   interview, turkestan. khorasan khoja. november 2010.
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Khoja in Central Asia, some Khojas claim Arab ancestry, but many of them 
reject this statement.
My conclusion is that the group relationships between the Uzbek-speaking 
and the Kazak-speaking, i. e. the descent group relationships on which this 
study concentrates, are due to a common or believed origin. The strongest 
arguments for a common origin have been derived from comparisons of ge-
nealogies despite some differences. Some of these, which are consciously 
used as group-identifying symbols (shrines, genealogies, etc.), are shared 
between ‘brother’ descent groups in different ethnic groups. Common ori-
gins and subsequent splits are also reported by oral history, so the two types 
of evidence used confirm each other. The state played a crucial role in the 
identity formation process in Central Asia during the Soviet period. I argue 
that the Soviet policy to homogenise society in Central Asia and to create the 
national identities could not eliminate some specific identities in the region. 
Despite the Soviet nationalities policy, some Khoja groups have preserved 
their identity. For some Khoja groups, ethnicity has been rather fluid while 
group identity is a comparatively conservative principle. Nevertheless, de-
pending on the situation and context, various identities are applicable. In the 
case of Khoja groups, the variations of identities are more numerous and 
complicated.
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those leFt-Behind: 
moBilitY and immoBilitY in 
the tajik countrYside
(MelteM Sancak)
Profile
Meltem Sancak holds a PhD in Anthropology from the University of Zurich. 
She is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Social 
Anthropology and, starting from January 2014, holds a SNSF-funded re-
search fellowship at Harvard University. She has conducted fieldwork in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakstan on questions of economic transformation, social 
change, migration and identity. Her new project is on the consequences of 
the mass migration of Central Asians to other parts of the world for those 
left behind.
while post-socialism has entered its third decade in central asia migration has 
become a primary answer to the often desolate conditions, in which people live. 
the main destination today is russia, although since the beginning of the eco-
nomic recovery Kazakstan started to attract some attention as well. Some mi-
grants also move to places like turkey, where most of them are working in the 
care business or are engaged in small-scale trade (akalin 2007). the lack of 
perspectives due to a massive job loss in the state sector in connection with 
population growth motivated particularly young people to search for other op-
tions. in most cases, the aim is to improve one’s living standards and save money 
for a house, a marriage or to establish a business (olimova and Bosc 2003).
migration has become one of the most researched issues in central asia in 
recent years. this is no surprise given the magnitude this phenomenon has 
reached and the consequences it has for the countries of origin. apart from 
the dangers the migrants encounter abroad, this has far-reaching impacts on 
those who stayed, those left-behind. what is missing in the literature is, how-
ever, a look at these effects of migration. this project proposes to study mo-
bility as well as ‘immobility’ in an integrative way rather than as separate 
phenomena. it proposes to see migration as one facet in larger social pro-
cesses, as one possible option and not so much as a distinct happening. the 
objective is thus to understand its relation with poverty and stratification as 
well as its impacts on gender, generations or ethnicity.
most studies on migration typically focus either on the motives that make 
people move or on the way they integrate into the host society and the degree 
Photo 1: remnants of the socialist past in rural tajikistan (M. Sancak, 2013)
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to which they maintain relations with their place of origin (Vertovec 2007). 
in the particular case of labour migration of central asians to russia and 
other places, the latter is certainly of preponderant importance. at least in the 
beginning these stays abroad are defined as temporary and as a way to pro-
vide one’s family with remittances. But while people migrate in order to keep 
things alive at home, they also aim at preserving what they leave behind, 
their houses, their land plots and their family structures. what has been less 
studied is this impact on home communities and more generally migration as 
one aspect of larger social changes. Besides those left behind there are also 
people who decide not to migrate. these will, however, be equally affected 
by the consequences of migration, at least when it is happening on a scale as 
is the case of central asia today.
tajikistan is still a somewhat neglected part of the region. surrounded by 
turkic speaking countries, it forms “an enclave of iranian language in a tur-
cophone area” (Djalali 1998:xi; see also Barfield 2010). The civil war, which 
lasted from 1992 until 1997, has put the country in a particularly difficult 
situation. Since 1991, the Tajik economy has been facing many difficulties 
that had short- and long-term effects on the life of rural households. as a 
landlocked and mountainous country with little arable land tajikistan was 
already marginal during soviet times (rowe 2009; harris 2004, 2006). it was 
little industrialized and has been highly dependent on the growing of cotton 
as in Uzbekistan. The basic needs of the population, like grain or energy, 
were in turn provided by other republics (harris 2006). still today, 70 percent 
of the total population in tajikistan live in rural areas. agriculture provides 
Photo 2: a group of women working as street vendors along the road between dushanbe 
and Qurghonteppa (M: sancak, 2013)
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the main employment facilities for 60 % of the population and makes up for 
some 30 % of the gdP. within the cis tajikistan still has the lowest income 
per capita with $1.750 – compared to $15.000 in Russia (Lerman 2009:303, 
kumo 2012). according to undP and the world Bank report of 2002 – 2003 
average monthly salaries are below 10 us dollars (world Bank 2003).
most Tajiks thus experienced fundamental changes in their lives. It started 
with the loss of jobs and the social security of the soviet days, which is still 
today highly appreciated and remembered. the following civil war added to 
this the loss of beloved ones as well as mass displacement and poverty. con-
sidering the economic and demographic trends it is easy to understand the 
out-migration from tajikistan. the only abundantly available resource is la-
bour because of the rapid population growth and the lack of other employ-
ment opportunities. according to kumo “more than 5 % of tajikistan’s total 
population and over 16 % of its economically active population have moved 
to russia alone as international labour migrants.” (2012:89). Between 1989, 
when the last Soviet census was taken, and 2000, when the first in independ-
ent tajikistan was conducted, the total population increased from 5.1 to 6.1 
millions, or by 20 % (rowland 2005). For 2011, estimations run as high as 
7.6 millions. of all the former soviet republics this is the most rapid growth 
rate. at the same time, between these two periods 437,000 people, mainly 
ethnic russians and ukrainians, left tajikistan. in the rural areas, population 
increase is even more remarkable and accounted for 30 %, even though the 
countryside lost 283,900 people due to rural-urban as well as international 
migration (rowland 2005).
Photo 3: with the migration of men, women and children became the providers for all 
daily needs. here they bring fuel back home  (M: Sancak, 2013)
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migration leaves traces in society in many different life spheres with dif-
ferent consequences for the individuals depending on gender and genera-
tional hierarchies. in the case of tajikistan mostly men leave and women stay 
behind. This has not only economic but also significant social consequences 
for the life of the people as ‘staying put’ (cf. reeves 2011). those who stayed 
have to continue to shoulder the burdens of everyday life as left-behinds. 
these family members have not only new responsibilities, but are confronted 
with changing domestic arrangements and other types of obligations to carry 
out during the unknown period of absence of their husbands, sons and fa-
thers.
remittances, no doubt, have an economic remedy for the families and 
money transferred from russia is often the prime source of livelihood (see 
also isabaeva 2011 for Kyrgyzstan). But while remittances can mitigate the 
economic precarious situation, they can also cause new tensions, difficulties 
and restrictions in other spheres. while some women take more responsibil-
ity and are strongly involved in decision-making processes, others experi-
ence even more social control and restrictions. especially for young women 
whose husbands are away or for girls whose fathers are absent, their behav-
iour is now more under control by their relatives since the honour of the 
family is strongly defined through their proper behaviour (reeves 2011).
This is confirmed by preliminary findings within this project. Besides the 
morality and honour aspects migration also produces gender imbalances as 
many women experience a new type of seclusion. Some women become the 
second wife of another man, so that a relative protection from poverty is 
Photo 4: a pile of handmade blankets and pillows for the dowry. the high costs of wedding 
ceremonies are one of the reasons for migration (M. Sancak, 2013)
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provided, but mostly by an islamic marriage and without legal rights. ab-
sence of husbands can also put some women in a situation that leads them to 
accept otherwise unacceptable behaviour by others with whom they live un-
der the same roof, like their mothers-in-law who often also control the remit-
tances of their sons. thus, while the status of the older generation is more 
consolidated, the status of younger females, and particularly that of daugh-
ters-in-law is weakened and becoming more vulnerable. in case of domestic 
tensions, the absence of the son can help to set the young bride adrift and 
force her back to her father’s house where she will usually be not very wel-
comed either.
at a basic level, this project will thus look very generally at the impacts of 
this mass out-migration on those left behind and the social changes it triggers 
off. other factors include the aftermath of the civil war, which has so funda-
mentally shaken the country, as well as population growth and land scarcity. 
thus, migration is one option to deal with an overall precarious situation that 
needs to be included in the analysis. one further question is if migration re-
ally brings relief or if it actually accelerates poverty for different reasons. it 
is not unusual that men who left do not come back since they have ‘second 
wives’ in russia or become victims of increasing racism there. in this case, 
for the partners who stay behind not only economic but also other problems 
emerge that one has to deal with as a widow or abandoned wife. this group 
of women are most confronted with severe poverty. in contrast, the success-
ful migrants and their families who invest back home by, for instance, estab-
lishing business, building new houses or extending their networks, create not 
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only economic-based stratification but also raise their position in society due 
to the experiences (and cultural capital, one might say) they gain abroad.
apparently, the impacts of migration on society at home reach also into 
other spheres of life where one would not expect them in the first place. One 
emerging phenomenon observed is that especially those who have to deal 
with the absence of their spouses find spiritual relief and support in religion. 
it will have to be established empirically if and why this development may 
be related with the problems caused by migration. what seems clear is that 
religious types of gatherings for many left-behinds serve as a chance to so-
cialise and experience exchange, as is the case also in Uzbekistan (sancak 
2012).
the ongoing migrations of today pose a fundamental challenge for society 
in tajikistan. while there is no physical force inherent, apart from the fact, 
that for most this is a question of survival, the ‘free’ movement of people is 
by some perceived as a threat. This is true first of all because, although there 
are also cases that women either accompany their husbands or leave by them-
selves, overall migration in tajikistan is strongly gendered. at the same time, 
the out-migration especially of young male is seen as a threat to country’s 
stability, in particular due to its geo-political location along the border with 
afghanistan. at the same time, the mass migration of tajiks and other cen-
tral asians provides places like russia with a reservoir of cheap labourers 
that fuel its economic growth. 
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Photo 1: Remnants of an ancient Buddha statue and the late bazaar – both destroyed 
in the recent wars.  (F. StahlMann, 2009) 
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the present research concerns the realisation of procedures of disputing un-
der the special circumstances of so-called ‘post-war’ times with a specific 
focus on primary disputing parties and their dispute management.
the city of Bamyan, located in the central highlands of afghanistan, pro-
vides a setting that is well suited for such an interest: on the one hand, the 
last decades of civil and regional wars and regime changes caused recurrent 
large shifts in power relations and immense changes in the social order. in 
consequence, these changes led to a huge diversification on the socio-cultur-
al, institutional and normative level, which adds to the plurality of ethnic and 
religious traditions. This diversification puts the order of disputing up for 
fundamental negotiation and makes it subject to a multitude of large- and 
small-scale legal and political interventions.
on the other hand, daily life has been peaceful and in practical terms safe 
since the ousting of the Taliban in 2001. At the time of fieldwork in 2009, the 
institutional landscape for offer in dispute management was relatively well 
established and supplemented by a wide range of (i)ngos. 
however, the large majority of people living in Bamyan assessed these 
conditions neither as secure, nor as just, and many would not even describe 
the current period as ‘post-war’. the research contributes to an understand-
mother of 7, 
grandmother of 28 
(F. StahlMann, 2009)
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ing of such a ‘post-war’ setting by analysing the reasons for these emic as-
sessments and the consequences they have on people’s dispute management. 
to do so, the project follows disputing parties through their dispute manage-
ment and analyses their decision-making processes in regards to questions 
crucial for the realisation of procedures of disputing. 
these questions include: who is regarded to be a party, how is the decision 
made to blame and by that to establish a disputing relationship, what defines the 
aims of the disputing process, how are third parties dealt with, and finally how 
are the results and at least temporary endings of disputing processes dealt with. 
This detailed analysis not only confirms the general assessment of norma-
tive plurality and an unsettled legal order. it also points to the problem of 
present uncertainty that parties are confronted with in their decision-making: 
uncertainty about the other parties’ means, interests and normative convic-
tions, about institutional agendas and practices, as well as about the social 
relationships that disputing relationships are based on – in short, uncertainty 
about information crucial for decision-making in disputing. uncertainty, 
however, not only concerns the present, but also the future. this future is by 
most expected to be the continuation of the past experience of recurrent fun-
damental socio-political change and even war, and therefor unpredictable. 
Photo 5: waiting for what there is to come.  (F. StahlMann, 2009)
Photo 4: discussing how to go on.  (F. StahlMann, 2009)
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This expectation of fundamental future changes in the socio-political or-
ganisation has tremendous effects on dispute management on its account: it 
closes the time-frame disputing strategies are based on in a manner not envis-
aged by the available normative orders and does not allow for sustainable 
solutions based on the parties’ interests. it further effectively inhibits the re-
negotiation of norms of legitimacy that a reliable order of disputing would 
require, even for those who engage in a negotiation of the future in normative 
terms. disputing mechanisms such as retaliation, mediation, and punishment 
thereby turn into means of negotiating power rather than justice and are de-
fined by those parties in power rather than those who might be legitimised on 
Photo 6: New Year’s celebration – hoping but not expecting a good one to come.
 (F. StahlMann, 2009)
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normative grounds. This is not only perceived as a continuation of the offi-
cially past war times, it also delegitimizes the current enterprise of state-
building and inhibits peace-building in socio-legal regards, despite Bamyan 
being politically peaceful in 2009.
analysing disputing parties’ decision-making processes thereby not only 
contributes to an understanding of the realisation of procedures and mecha-
nisms of disputing and the workings of a legal order in times of fundamental 
change. it moreover emphasises the importance of how actors interpret such 
circumstances based on their experiences with the past and expectations of 
the future. 
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the steppes of western mongolia have been a place of pastoral nomadism for 
many centuries, which has shaped the life of its local communities in profound 
ways. And this life has always been one exposed to particular risks due to pas-
toralists’ high dependence on dynamic natural and social conditions, including 
human and animal predators, epidemics and climate conditions. this is true for 
mongolian pastoralists as much as for pastoralists anywhere in the world. in 
recent decades, these risks have, however, experienced new forms and have 
partly turned life into a state of uncertainty. this project follows these changes 
and analyses the strategies that pastoralists adopt to deal with them.
in the course of the 20th century, mongolian pastoralists have experienced 
dramatic transformation processes starting with the collectivization and estab-
lishment of a socialist production regime since the 1930s (rosenberg 1981; 
goldstein and Beall 1994; humphrey and sneath 1999; rossabi 2005). 
through the pastoral cooperatives social and economic services like health 
care, free education and transportation, veterinary services, hay production and 
winter shelters were provided. the cooperatives also controlled most aspects 
of the pastoral production, including specialisations in herding and annual 
grazing cycles. What this also implied was a transfer of responsibility and risk 
from the individual producer to the state (Potkanski 1993; Finke 2004).
once the soviet union and with it socialism suddenly collapsed in 1991, the 
situation changed again rapidly. mongolia had to implement fundamental re-
forms towards a market economy that were followed by extremely high unem-
ployment rates, increasing poverty and general uncertainty. the collectives in 
the rural areas were dismantled and livestock privatised turning herder house-
Photo 1: the statue of 
galdan Boshigt, last ruler 
of the west-mongolian 
oyrats, in the city of khovd 
(P. Finke, 2011)
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holds into small private enterprises again (Potkanski 1993; Finke 2003; sneath 
2003). the relapse of the formerly stable and subsidised economy caused a crisis 
of the existing political, economic and social institutions and radically cut people 
off from their secure and well-organised lives under socialism (rossabi 2005).
we will look in this project at the impacts these changes had on pastoralists 
in the western parts of the country, more specifically in the northern part of 
the province of khovd. the region is also known for its natural beauty, com-
posed of the high mountain ranges of the mongolian altay on the one hand, 
and steppe lowlands, which include the world’s most northern deserts on the 
other hand. in-between are some of the largest lakes in the country, although 
most of them salty. With annual average temperatures around zero and pre-
cipitation rates between 100 and 300 mm local ecology poses a serious chal-
lenge for human economic activities aiming to secure their livelihoods. most 
of the area may only be used as seasonal pastures that allow the raising of 
sheep and goats, cattle, horses and a few camels. as vegetation is scarce, 
grazing cycles are very complex and in need of substantial space and flexibil-
ity. Agriculture as a supplement does exist along the lower course of some of 
the major rivers, and may locally be of high importance. in cultural terms, the 
region is considered the most heterogeneous in the country. Besides numer-
Photo 2: summer pasture in western mongolia, along the river Buyant 
 (l. tubach, 2013)
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ous mongolian groups like khalkha, Zakhchin, dörvöd or Ööld, khovd 
province also harbours a large number of turkic-speakers, primarily Kazaks 
and a few tuvinians, as well as uryankhai. this ethnic diversity has impacts 
on pastoral land allocation as well as on differences in economic and social 
strategies employed in dealing with the current challenges.
in spite of this, the region and its people have seen comparatively little 
scholarly attention. the challenges that pastoralists in khovd – as in other 
parts of the country – face ground, first of all, in the on-going difficulties of 
adapting to a new economic regime. Problems of market access and high 
transaction costs were particularly severe during most of the 1990s (Finke 
2004). in the case of the Kazaks, the main strategy to counter this was to 
broaden the basis of ones household by diversifying economic activities, par-
ticularly including agriculture and trade where suitable. this was to reduce 
risks among less well-off households while for the rich it provided a mean to 
accumulate and spread wealth. At the same time, increasing ones herd size 
was also designed as a risk-minimizing strategy while the shift to more goats 
was to take advantage of the only animal resource easily and profitably to be 
marketed, namely cashmere. the increase in livestock and the rise of trans-
portation costs, however, resulted in a decrease in mobility and growing dis-
content regarding access to land rights. the redistribution of livestock in 
private hands and the return to multi-species herds also played a key role in 
this (Finke 2000). at the same time, a general mistrust in social institutions, 
and often in each other, did not make cooperative solutions easy to achieve 
(Finke 2004). in the meanwhile, due to the sudden uncertainty and economic 
Photo 3: milking goats (l. tubach, 2013)
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downturn of the early 1990s, many urban citizens took refugee in rural areas 
and picked up nomadic pastoralism as an alternative livelihood, since jobs 
and even food supplies were hardly to be found anymore. the number of 
herder households in rural areas thereby increased significantly (Pald 1993; 
Rossabi 2005). This was a marked contrast to the increasing sedentarization 
processes in other parts of the pastoralist world (Fratkin 1997).
however, since the end of the 1990s this trend started to reverse and pastoral-
ism to lose on its long-term role as national economic backbone (mearns 2004; 
Galvin 2009). While a certain flourishing of markets and rising demand for meat 
in urban places has benefitted pastoralists, at the same time, increasing risks de-
tain people more and more to act upon those directly. one of these threats is 
natural disasters. Between 1999 and 2002 a series of severe droughts and harsh 
winter hazards (called dzud in mongolian) caused enormous loss of livestock. 
Many pastoralist existences were tragically disrupted. Although animals had re-
covered by 2005, this was unequally spread among herders. then, most tragi-
cally, another dzud hit mongolia in 2009 and repeatedly in 2010, when again 
20 % of the total national livestock population was lost. the western regions 
were in both cases among the most severely affected areas. mongolian pastoral-
ists traditionally used to have a very sophisticated knowledge of dzud and people 
are aware that those are part of their natural ecological environment. But the 
frequency in recent years is perceived as unnatural and assigned to climate 
change and global warming (Fernández-Gimenez et al. 2012).
A second challenge is related to land allocation rules. During the privatization 
process in the early 1990s pastureland was explicitly excluded. At the same time, 
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the mongolian state steadily withdrew from its involvement in pasture regula-
tions (mearns 1993; Finke 2004; upton 2012). this causes ambiguity and con-
fusion among herders. in many places the concentration caused “overstocking, 
declined seasonal movements and out-of-season grazing” (himmelsbach 2012: 
165). Additionally, growing territorial conflicts prompted “a breakdown of pas-
ture use norms, trust and cooperation amongst herders” (upton 2012: 229). tres-
passing for instance had become a significant problem and source of offence 
(Finke 2000, 2004). in part, ‘new nomads’ or ‘newcomers’ have contributed to 
such conflicts due to lacking awareness or acceptance of customary rules (ross-
abi 2005; upton 2012). new national land laws are on their way for some time 
and are expected to become implemented sooner or later. They consider Western 
neoliberal economic models that suggest privatization of land increases private 
responsibility and therefore stimulates economic growth effectively. this would, 
however, complicate the customary use of pastureland and reduce the herders’ 
mobility, since – as in other parts of the world – “land tenure changes from com-
munal to private ownership often fragments grassland” (galvin 2009: 186). dif-
ferent scholars have argued that mobility in itself plays a key role in sustainable 
pasture management in mongolia (e. g. humphrey and sneath 1999; sneath 
2003, stumpp et al. 2005; sternberg 2012). still, mongolian herders lack influ-
ence on governmental regulation matters (sternberg 2012). Bottom-up ap-
proaches focus on herder-groups that were implemented through these projects 
for increasing resilience against natural risks. advantages of the law would be a 
reduction of free-riding, decreasing transaction costs through enhanced interper-
sonal trust, and growing social capital through bottom-up unionism (himmels-
bach 2012). Such expectations are, however, mainly based on theoretical grounds 
and very little on actual empirical proof. it has been demonstrated that state 
regulations or privatization of commons from ‘outside’ are often less effective 
than locally organised cooperation (ostrom 1990). Furthermore, relevant ques-
tions concerning the pastoralists’ membership, the levels of people’s actual par-
ticipation and in- and exclusion processes prove to be rather ambivalent (upton 
2012). Mongolian, as well as Kazak, pastoralists appear to rather avoid formal 
associational groups and prefer participating within personal and informal net-
works (Finke 2004; Byambajav 2012). and, concerns are that enhanced group 
cohesion among established herder-groups might stimulate an exclusion of the 
poorest (upton 2008; himmelsbach 2012).
Finally, as a third threat, the growing legal and illegal mining sector in mon-
golia is another strain on the herders’ customary institutions regulating pasture 
usage and their relationship with the government, but in fact also with one an-
other. While the mining industry has been most beneficial for the national mar-
ket value, on its downside it heavily pollutes and destroys pastureland. as a re-
sult, many herder households have been displaced without receiving appropriate 
compensation (Dierkens & Byambajav 2012). collective resistance lacks suf-
ficient social infrastructures and mainly depends on non-local, national and in-
Photo 4: Kazaks selling potatoes to a trader from Ulaanbaatar (P. Finke, 2011)
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ternational mediators. collective action against illegal mining, commonly re-
ferred to as ninja mining, is even less cohesive due to growing conflicts of 
interests between herders and its ambivalent implications. it is not used to gen-
erate long-term wealth, as an alternative to herding, but is rather an expression 
of temporary autonomy. money earned through illegal mining is perceived as 
‘polluted’ and often immediately spent, mainly on alcohol, which makes ninja 
mining rather “an auxiliary economy to herding – not its replacement” (High 
2008: 210). herders are said to end up mining in the areas that they initially 
tried to protect, despite their awareness of the negative long-term effects on 
pastureland, in other words facing a problem of collective action. this addi-
tional pressure on local cooperation could enhance a ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
(Hardin 1968) by investing in short-term benefits while at the same time de-
stroying the commons the herders depend on.
Prospects of a rural livelihood in mongolia have thus arguably changed 
from a situation of calculable risks to menacing uncertainty. hence it is 
doubtful whether mongolian pastoralists’ traditional economic and social 
strategies are still sufficient. The intention behind this project is to come to 
understand the consequences and responses among mongolian pastoralists, 
their actions and considerations from a micro-level perspective. at the core 
will be the various strategies, economic, social or cultural, that people em-
ploy to deal with a situation full of uncertainties. also, little is know about 
people’s perceptions of such changes as well as their effects on formal and 
informal social institutions. at the same time, the on-going economic and 
social stratification among pastoralists has not been of help to increase coop-
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eration either. they have become a far less homogenous group and vulnera-
bility becomes a more individualised matter. at the same time, obscurity 
about customary and formal rules that no longer apply trigger conflicts con-
cerning territorial issues among pastoralists. although by and large peaceful, 
ethnicity may also start playing a significant role in the way people create 
social loyalties and boundaries, especially within the context of a dominant 
ethnic khalkh nation and state ideology (Bulag 1998).
what the crisis in the pastoral sector has also invoked is a return of the earlier 
urban-rural migration. many who have lost their animals in the consecutive dzud 
have decided to move to town, either the regional centre, the city of khovd, or to 
the national capital ulaanbaatar. as livestock losses affected many of the ‘new 
nomads’ in particular, these are also prominent among the families seeking ref-
uge in an urban setting. decisively different is the situation among the local 
Kazaks. While there has also been a minor migration to Mongolian towns, the 
vast majority has decided to leave the country altogether and move to neighbour-
ing Kazakstan (Finke forthcoming). In combination with ongoing stratification, 
the temptation to move is expected to lower social cohesion and mutual trust 
making collective action an even more difficult to achieve task.
in theoretical terms, the project looks at issues of risk and uncertainty, prop-
erty rights and institutional change as well as the decision-making processes 
related to that. Rapid socio-economic stratification processes and anxiety 
about the meaning and outcome of ongoing transformations inevitably will 
change social life. Institutional changes are significant since they are ex-
pressed through new formal and informal arrangements (Knight & Ensminger 
1998). this applies to post-socialist mongolia, where the state predominantly 
withdrew from its former responsibilities, in a very specific way (Finke 2004). 
Further, the lack of formally implemented regulations and sanctioning as well 
as ambiguity towards informal norms significantly increases the levels of un-
certainty. however, risk can also be approached as a phenomenon that inter-
relates “cognitive frameworks people use to interpret misfortune and […] 
strategies people adopt to cope with crises” (Bollig 2006: 9).
in an uncertain situation however decision-makers lack such information, 
which makes calculations even more difficult, especially when social and 
political institutions malfunction. crucial in this regard are property rights. 
the meaning and credibility of land laws in mongolia, however, are unclear 
due to the deficiency of the sanctioning of misbehaviour, like in the case of 
illegal gold miners, and lack of necessary time depth and reliability (Finke 
2004). This perspective prevents the simplifying assumptions that firstly, so-
cial cohesion and social capital necessarily exists among people from the 
rural areas and secondly, that people’s individual aims match with general 
pastoral group-interests. instead, social institutions, actions and perceptions 
are approached as process-oriented and studied from within at an empirical 
level of everyday life.
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